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Partial takings allow the government to expropriate the parts of an
asset it needs, leaving the owner the remainder. Both vital and
common, partial takings present unique challenges to the standard
rules of eminent domain. Partial takings may result in the creation of
suboptimal, and even unusable, parcels. Additionally, partial takings
create assessment problems that do not arise when parcels are taken as a
whole. Finally, partial takings engender opportunities for inefficient
strategic behavior on the part of the government after the partial taking
has been carried out. Current jurisprudence fails to resolve these problems and can even exacerbate them.
This Article offers an innovative mechanism that remediates the
shortcomings of extant partial takings doctrines. It proposes that the
government give owners whose property is partially taken the power to
force the government to purchase the remainder of the lot at fair market
value. Exercise of this power by the private owner would lead to the
reuniﬁcation of the land in its pretaking form while transferring title to
the entire parcel to a new single owner—namely the government.
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Implementation of our proposal would yield important beneﬁts,
including allowing for the preservation of current parcel conﬁguration,
lowering the cost of the adjudication process as a whole, and reducing
the ability of the government to behave strategically. Additionally, our
proposal would create opportunities for more efficient planning and
land use by the government as the government would be free to reparcel,
develop, and resell the parcels sold to it.
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INTRODUCTION
Partial or incomplete takings allow the government to expropriate
those particular parts of an asset that it needs, leaving the owner to retain
the remainder.1 The evidence shows that partial takings are ubiquitous.
At least in some jurisdictions, partial takings are more common than
total takings.2 In fact, in some cases, the law of the jurisdiction pushes
authorities to engage in partial takings rather than complete takings.3
Partial takings are routinely used when the government engages in public construction projects, particularly in the area of transportation.4 They
are also common in cases in which the government needs to erect
protective barriers against ﬂooding on beachfront properties and
riparian lots.5
At ﬁrst blush, one might assume that partial takings are more
efficient and fairer than total takings, as they take no more property than
necessary. This ﬁrst impression is incorrect, however. Partial takings
impose two substantial costs. The ﬁrst cost is administrative. Because in
many cases there is no market for the particular slice of the asset seized
by the government, determining the value of the partial taking (and,
therefore, the compensation to be paid) is quite difficult and expensive.6
The second cost relates to the value of the parcel itself. While the partial
taking is motivated by a government need for the particular slice seized,
there may be little private use for what remains of the parcel. A partial
taking may render the remainder practically or legally unﬁt for ordinary
use. The remaining land may fail to comply with size or setback
restrictions or otherwise be no longer ﬁt for use. Likewise, the remainder
may simply depreciate in value in light of changes effected by the
government project. Consequently, the partial taking might prove to be
less efficient than keeping the asset together, even if the government
were to underutilize some parts of the total asset.7

1. See generally Julius L. Sackman, 4A Nichols on Eminent Domain § 14.01 (3d ed.
2017) [hereinafter 4A Nichols on Eminent Domain].
2. Ronit Levine-Schnur & Gideon Parchomovsky, Is the Government Fiscally Blind?
An Empirical Examination of the Effect of the Compensation Requirement on EminentDomain Exercises, 45 J. Legal Stud. 437, 450 (2016) (highlighting a study of takings in
which only 42% of the observed cases were total takings).
3. See, e.g., Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1534–37 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding
that Vermont, as a matter of state law, was required to proceed with a partial taking to acquire
“only that which it needed” to achieve the state’s goals).
4. See Xiaoxia Xiong & Kara Kockelman, Cost of Right-of-Way Acquisition:
Recognizing the Impact of Condemnation via a Switching Regression Model, 20 J.
Infrastructure Sys. 04014021-1, 0414021-2 (2014) (summarizing a study showing that in
excess of 90% of Texas Department of Transportation takings were partial takings).
5. See infra notes 19–24 and accompanying text.
6. See infra Part I.
7. See infra notes 36–43 and accompanying text.
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This Article proposes a new approach to partial takings that
addresses both aforementioned costs at once. Whenever the government
elects to engage in a partial taking, the private property owner should be
given a put option8 that will entitle her to sell the remainder of the lot to
the government. The exercise price of the put option should be a percentage of the fair market value of the asset as a whole, with both the
percentage and the market value of the whole determined at the time of
the partial taking. As a consequence of the exercise of the option, the
title to the parcel would be uniﬁed in the hands of the government. And,
as the new owner of the title to the entire parcel, the government would
have full discretion as to how to use or dispose of the parcel in the
future.
Under present law, the power of eminent domain grants the government what is functionally a call option9 over all private property. The
government’s call option is exercisable at fair market value and is subject
to the largely toothless public use requirement in the Constitution.10
Extant law recognizes no such option in private parties to buy or sell
land. The introduction of our mechanism would give private property
owners a limited put option, exercisable at fair market value in a small set
of cases: those in which the government decided to use its call option to
take only part of the land of an individual owner.
As an illustration of how our proposed system would work, consider
the following example. Assume that the government wants to expand the
street adjacent to Abby’s land. The government does not need all of
Abby’s land to widen the street; it therefore takes 68% of Abby’s parcel by
eminent domain. Assume, further, that the fair market value of Abby’s
parcel is $100,000 and that, prima facie, all parts of the land are of equal
value. Under current law, the baseline for compensating Abby will be the
amount of $68,000 for the part taken.11 In addition, Abby can demand
additional compensation for the “severance harm” she suffered and for
8. A put option empowers the option holder to sell a good, entitlement, or future
commodity to a certain counterparty at a preset price or a price to be decided in the future. See
Ian Ayres, Protecting Property with Puts, 32 Val. U. L. Rev., 793, 796 (1998) [hereinafter Ayres,
Protecting Property]; Put Option, Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/
putoption.asp [http://perma.cc/5ZQA-XZSD] (last visited Sept. 19, 2017); see also infra
section II.A.
9. A call option allows the option holder to purchase an asset, entitlement, or future
commodity from a certain counterparty at a preagreed price or at a price to be determined in
the future. See Ayres, Protecting Property, supra note 8, at 796; Call Option, Investopedia,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/calloption.asp [http://perma.cc/SPY3-UZD7] (last
visited Sept. 28, 2017); see also infra section II.A.
10. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Uselessness of Public Use, 106
Colum. L. Rev. 1412, 1423 (2006) [hereinafter Bell & Parchomovsky, The Uselessness of
Public Use] (describing the libertarian criticism that Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S.
469 (2005), failed to narrow the Supreme Court’s public use doctrine).
11. In our example, we presumed that the taken land was not only 68% of the whole
in size but also 68% of the whole in value. This presumption is unlikely to bear true in
reality.
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the diminution in value of the remainder.12 The government may seek to
offset compensation with the value of certain beneﬁts the taking bestows
upon Abby’s remaining property.13 Note, however, that the severance and
diminution harms are very difficult to substantiate and that proving them
imposes considerable costs on Abby—in both money and time. Under
our proposal, Abby would have the option of sidestepping the procedure
of proving severance and diminution harms by simply forcing the
government to take her lot in its entirety and pay the market value of her
entire lot (i.e., $100,000).14
It bears emphasis that we do not propose forcing the government to
retain title to the remainder it would receive via exercise of put or call
options. On the contrary, the government would acquire the prerogatives
of the owner and thus retain complete liberty in deciding what to do with
the land it receives. The government could either retain the entire
parcel, if it preferred, or reparcel the land in any way it wanted and sell
parts on the open market.
Our proposal presents four advantages over the current legal regime.
First, it prevents the creation of parcels that are suboptimally conﬁgured
for use. Under our proposed regime, were a partial taking to threaten to
leave the remainder unﬁt for use, the owner (or the government) would
exercise her put (or its call) option to stop this result from occurring.
Second, and relatedly, our proposal creates a readily available mechanism for reuniting the title to the lot as a whole in the hands of a single
owner, thereby preempting the creation of negative externalities that
tend to arise in cases of split ownership. Concretely, our mechanism
12. See infra section I.B.2.
13. See infra section I.B.1.
14. An integral component of our proposal is the determination of the ratio of the
value of the part of the land taken to the value of the land as a whole. Knowing the value
ratio is essential to setting the strike price of the call and put options (i.e., the amount the
government would have to pay Abby in the event the option were exercised). Indeed, in
many senses, the value ratio is the strike price. In our example, if the ratio were 68%, the
strike price would be 32% of the value of the lot as a whole—$32,000. If the option were
exercised at a later time, the strike price would have to be adjusted by the relevant
measure of inﬂation, which would be the price index for realty.
We suggest two alternative ways of establishing the strike price. The easiest way would
be to carry forward current doctrines for establishing the value of partial assets. Courts
would use these doctrines to determine the value of the taken land, which, when
compared with the value of the asset as a whole, would yield the value ratio. An alternative
means for establishing the ratio would be to allow either the government or the aggrieved
owner to set the ratio or even to set the ratio arbitrarily at the percentage in size, rather
than value, of the land taken as compared to the plot as a whole. Size is easier to measure,
and, of course, self-assessment may lead to the revelation of private information. This
alternative would obviously create some interesting strategic pressures to overstate or
understate value (in the case of self-assessment) or otherwise to take advantage of the gap
between size and actual value. However, availability of the put and call options would
correct any misincentives created by the gap between stated and actual value ratios. See
infra sections II.A–.B.
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ensures that over time the government does not increase or change the
nature of its use of the parts taken in a way that harms the remainder.
Third, our mechanism creates an incentive for the government to engage
in more efficient planning and land-development policies. In many
eminent domain projects, the government takes title to multiple parcels
and can, therefore, unlock synergies across parcels that owners of
individual lots cannot possibly unlock or even envision. Fourth, and
ﬁnally, at least in some variants, our proposal creates signiﬁcant cost savings, relative to the existing rule, by obviating the need to appraise the
value of the part that remains in the hands of the private owner after the
taking. Indeed, our proposal can sometimes suffice with appraising the
value of the parcel as a whole, which should be a much easier task.
While our proposal is self-contained, it has obvious implications for a
number of other issues in the world of takings. Accordingly, after presenting our proposal, we brieﬂy discuss several potential extensions. We
demonstrate how a mechanism of self-assessment can be incorporated
into our basic model and analyze how it would change the incentives of
the parties. Next, we examine how our basic model for partial takings of
land can be used in the contexts of partial takings of chattel. Finally, we
look at whether our model can be used to address issues of partial regulatory takings and conclude that it cannot.
Structurally, the Article unfolds in four parts. In Part I, we position
the phenomenon of partial takings within the larger framework of
eminent domain and discuss the rationales that have been proffered to
support the practice. Additionally, we enumerate the drawbacks that
attend partial takings and the costs they impose on society. In Part II, we
present our reform proposal. Drawing on the rich literature on the use
of options within law, we detail the option mechanism with which we seek
to replace the current legal regime. In Part III, we consider several
potential objections to our model. Speciﬁcally, we look at whether the
model should apply to very small takings, and we introduce a de minimis
limitation into our basic model. Additionally, we consider the possible
impact on state holdings of land and the potential constitutional
limitations on our model. Finally, in Part IV, we contemplate and evaluate
several extensions of our model by offering an alternative self-assessment
valuation mechanism for determining the price of the options, extending
our model to partial chattel takings, and assessing the applicability of our
model to partial regulatory takings. A short conclusion ensues.
I. THE LANDSCAPE OF PARTIAL TAKINGS
A.

Partial and Other Takings

The government typically takes property by eminent domain when it
needs the property for a purpose other than that to which it is currently
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put to use.15 It will not generally take farmland to establish a government
farm but rather to build a road. The physical conﬁguration that ﬁts the
old use of the property often does not match the new use of the property.
A narrow strip of land suffices for a highway; the entire farm is rarely
needed.16
For this reason, partial takings are ubiquitous. It is reasonable to
estimate that there are at least as many partial takings as total takings in
some jurisdictions.17 We suspect that most government projects do not
require seizures of lots in their entirety and that the government has no
need to take an entire parcel of land when a part will do. Construction or
expansion of roads, trails, railroad tracks, or other forms of infrastructure almost always relies on partial takings. As an illustration, consider
the case of Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., in which the
Supreme Court ruled that the placement of cable on private buildings in
New York City, together with a small box on the roof, amounted to a
partial taking that required the payment of compensation to the building
owners.18
Partial takings are common in yet another category of cases: beach
replenishment.19 Consider the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy. The storm
had destroyed coastal dunes, laying bare the littoral oceanfront properties.20 To protect these properties, as well as the safety of the public at
15. See, e.g., Kelo, 545 U.S. at 472–75 (discussing the constitutionality of government
use of eminent domain to transform condemned residential property into mixed-use
development); Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242 (1984) (holding that use of
eminent domain to correct market failures in real property was a proper application of
public use under the Fifth Amendment); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35 (1954)
(holding that the government interest of addressing urban blight was a proper application
of public use under the Fifth Amendment); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 370
(1943) (noting that condemnation of a strip of private land for public railroad use was
necessary); Julius L. Sackman, 2A Nichols on Eminent Domain § 6.01 (3d ed. 2017)
[hereinafter 2A Nichols on Eminent Domain].
16. See Julius L. Sackman, 1A Nichols on Eminent Domain § 3.02(2)(b) (3d ed.
2017) [hereinafter 1A Nichols on Eminent Domain] (detailing the government’s authority
to condemn private property for various public uses, including highways); 2A Nichols on
Eminent Domain, supra note 15, § 7.06 (highlighting the taking of private property for a
public highway as the oldest of many valid public uses); see also Ellen Frankel Paul,
Property Rights and Eminent Domain 7–14 (1987) (describing the concept of eminent
domain); Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, The Economics of Eminent Domain:
Private Property, Public Use, and Just Domain, 3 Found. & Trends Microeconomics 275,
280–82 (2007) (providing an overview of case law relating to eminent domain).
17. See, e.g., Levine-Schnur & Parchomovsky, supra note 2, at 450 (highlighting that
58% of the 3,140 takings in Tel Aviv, Israel, between 1990 and 2014 were partial takings).
18. 458 U.S. 419, 425–41 (1982).
19. See James G. Titus, Rising Seas, Coastal Erosion, and the Takings Clause: How to
Save Wetlands and Beaches Without Hurting Property Owners, 57 Md. L. Rev. 1279, 1299–
301, 1346 (1998).
20. Jenny Anderson, Rebuilding the Coastline, but at What Cost?, N.Y. Times (May 18,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/19/nyregion/rebuilding-the-coastline-but-at-whatcost.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review); St. Petersburg Coastal & Marine Sci. Ctr.,
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large and the coastal systems, the state governments of New Jersey21 and
New York22 committed to reconstituting the coastal dunes, partly on public property but mostly on private land. The measures involved multiple
partial takings that attracted the wrath of certain private property owners
and triggered litigation.23
Another category of cases that has occasioned partial takings consists
of the expansion of riverbeds or navigational routes.24 Such changes in
the layout of rivers invariably involve reconﬁguration of the boundaries
of riparian lots. While such adjustments typically involve multiple lots, it
is possible that, in some cases, only one lot will be affected.
In all these cases, the government needs only a portion of existing
parcels of land for its project. A partial taking, therefore, gives the government what it needs for its project while saving valuable resources.
This is because the law of eminent domain requires the government to
pay only for what it takes.25 Hence, the government will often allow a partial taking to suffice for ﬁnancial reasons. In some cases, state law even
requires the state to proceed with a partial taking when that is all that is
necessary to achieve the state’s aim.26
Hurricane Sandy Response—Storm Impacts and Vulnerability of Coastal Beaches, U.S.
Geological Survey, http://coastal.er.usgs.gov/sandy-storm-impact-vulnerability/research/
coastal-impacts.html [http://perma.cc/28Z2-ZQ7W] (last modified Dec. 5, 2016) (describing
the damage from Hurricane Sandy).
21. See Leslie Garisto Pfaff, Sea Change: Post-Sandy Rebuilding, N.J. Monthly (Dec.
11, 2012), http://njmonthly.com/articles/jersey-shore/sea-change-post-sandy-rebuilding
[http://perma.cc/M3UX-BR7R]; Elise Young, New Jersey Shore Towns Challenge Sand Dunes
Plan as Storms Gather, Ins. J. (May 5, 2016), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/east/
2016/05/05/407618.htm [http://perma.cc/8BSK-JQYB].
22. See Lisa W. Foderaro, Fire Island Residents to Lose Their Homes to Make Way for a
Dune, N.Y. Times (July 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/19/nyregion/somehouses-on-fire-island-to-be-torn-down-to-make-way-for-new-dune.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review); De Blasio Administration Releases Progress Report on Sandy Recovery and
Resiliency, NYC.gov (Oct. 22, 2015) http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/749-15/deblasio-administration-releases-progress-report-sandy-recovery-resiliency [http://perma.cc/JX6B39Y9].
23. Wayne Parry, Beachfront Owners Challenge Sand Dunes Plan, Courier-Post (Jan. 21,
2016), http://www.courierpostonline.com/story/news/local/south-jersey/2016/01/21/beachproperty-lawsuit/79116298 [http://perma.cc/TE4W-SJS4]; see also Matthew Hromadka,
Comment, The Price of Protection: Compensation for Partial Takings Along the Coast, 30
Touro L. Rev. 861, 876–77 (2014); Louis M. Russo, Note, From Railroads to Sand Dunes: An
Examination of the Offsetting Doctrine in Partial Takings, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 1539, 1541
(2014).
24. See, e.g., Hromadka, supra note 23, at 875–76 (discussing United States v. Fort Smith
River Dev. Corp., 349 F.2d 522 (8th Cir. 1965)). See generally Richard S. Harnsberger, Eminent
Domain and Water Law, 48 Neb. L. Rev. 325 (1969) (examining just compensation as it relates
to “water development and allocation”).
25. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, 87 Va. L. Rev.
277, 279 (2001) [hereinafter Bell & Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed].
26. A statute of this kind was the source of the decision to take only an easement for
a railroad track, which led to the litigation of Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525
(Fed. Cir. 1996).
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It is worth noting another important aspect of partial takings: Partial
takings cases paradigmatically implicate the core justiﬁcations for the
existence of a power of eminent domain. Accepted lore justiﬁes the
power of eminent domain on the grounds that it is necessary to
overcome the twin problems of high transaction costs and holdouts that
would otherwise undermine the government’s ability to carry out
valuable social projects.27 The takings literature suggests that high
transaction costs are positively correlated with the number of lots
affected.28 Speciﬁcally, the more private lots a project involves, the more
rights the government will need to clear, and the higher the cost of the
project will rise. The holdout problem, by contrast, arises whenever the
government must gain access to a particular lot.29 In such cases, in a world
without eminent domain, the relevant private owner could try to extract
the entire surplus arising from the project before consenting to the
transaction.30 The holdout problem arises when the government has no
reasonable substitutes to a particular parcel and must appropriate that
parcel alone.31
The twin problems of high transaction costs and holdouts are
endemic to projects that rely on partial takings. Almost inevitably, partial
takings rely on particular parcels, making the partial taking highly vulnerable to holdouts. At the same time, while partial takings may not
involve a large number of parcels, the transaction costs associated with a
partial taking can be quite high. This is due to the particular problems
partial takings raise—particularly in establishing the value of the partial
lots taken—that we explore in depth later in this Part.32 In order to take
property by eminent domain, the state must pay “just compensation” to
the owner whose property is taken.33 Figuring out the amount that con27. Jonathan Klick & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Value of the Right to Exclude: An
Empirical Assessment, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 917, 937 (2017).
28. See Thomas J. Miceli, The Economic Approach to Law 216–17 (2004); Lloyd
Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J. Legal Stud. 351, 356 (1991); Daniel B. Kelly,
Acquiring Land Through Eminent Domain: Justiﬁcations, Limitations, and Alternatives, in
Research Handbook on the Economics of Property Law 343, 345–50 (Kenneth Ayotte &
Henry E. Smith eds., 2011); Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Land Assembly and
the Holdout Problem Under Sequential Bargaining, 14 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 372, 374–75
(2012).
29. The need for a particular lot and the need for many lots are not mutually
exclusive. For instance, the collection of many lots to build a road may make particular lots
necessary in order to complete the road.
30. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1106–07 (1972);
Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segersen, Holdups and Holdouts: What Do They Have in
Common?, 117 Econ. Letters 330, 332 (2012).
31. Of course, the parcel may be needed in conjunction with other parcels to enable
the government use.
32. See infra section I.C.
33. The just compensation requirement appears not only in the U.S. Constitution,
which guarantees “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just
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stitutes “just compensation” is a perennial difficulty.34 Calculating compensation for partial takings is far more difficult35 and, concomitantly,
more expensive.
The choice of whether to pursue a partial taking is thus a difficult
one for the state. Partial takings may reduce the amount of direct compensation paid by the government for property, but at the same time,
they create additional costs that must be borne, in part, by the state.
A further complication is added by the fact that the state’s decision
to pursue a partial taking does not take full account of the social costs
engendered by such takings.
Full and accurate compensation for takings is indispensable to the
proper functioning of the government’s power of eminent domain.36
Accurate compensation is necessary for three distinct reasons. First,
accurate compensation ensures fairness for aggrieved owners by ensuring
that individual property owners are not forced to bear costs that ought
rightly to be borne by society as a whole.37 Second, accurate compensation ensures that government decisionmakers do not suffer from “ﬁscal
illusion”—the illusion that social costs matter only when they ﬁnd
expression in government budgets.38 Third, and ﬁnally, accurate comcompensation,” U.S. Const. amend. V, but also in state constitutions. Julius L. Sackman, 1
Nichols on Eminent Domain § 1.3 (3d ed. 2017). Indeed, the compensation requirement
is understood around the world to be a necessary companion to the power of eminent
domain. Simon Keith et al., Food Agric. Org. of the United Nations, Compulsory
Acquisition of Land and Compensation 11–15 (2008), ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/011/
i0506e/i0506e00.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also 1A Nichols on Eminent
Domain, supra note 16, § 1C.02.
34. Patrick J. Rohan & Melvin A. Reskin, 9 Nichols on Eminent Domain § G31.04 (3d
ed. 2017) [hereinafter 9 Nichols on Eminent Domain]; Katrina Miriam Wyman, The
Measure of Just Compensation, 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 239, 252–61 (2007); see also infra
note 40.
35. Julius L. Sackman, 3 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 8A.02 (3d ed. 2017)
[hereinafter 3 Nichols on Eminent Domain].
36. See Bell & Parchomovsky, The Uselessness of Public Use, supra note 10, at 1416–17.
37. See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (articulating this
rationale).
38. There is an ongoing debate about the degree to which ﬁscal illusion actually
occurs in the real world. In support of the theory that ﬁscal illusion impacts government
decisionmaking, see, e.g., David A. Dana & Thomas W. Merrill, Property: Takings 41–46
(2002); Thomas J. Miceli, Economics of the Law: Torts, Contracts, Property, Litigation 141
(1997); Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 56, 73–74 (2007); Lawrence Blume
& Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 Calif. L. Rev.
569, 620–28 (1984); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 Harv. L.
Rev. 509, 567–70 (1986). But see Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law
130 (2004) (questioning the ﬁscal illusion theory as a justiﬁcation for the compensation
requirement); Bethany R. Berger, The Illusion of Fiscal Illusion in Regulatory Takings, 66
Am. U. L. Rev. 1, 7–16 (2016) (arguing the ﬁscal illusion theory incorrectly assumes
government officials are driven by maximizing ﬁscal returns); Yun-Chien Chang, Empire
Building and Fiscal Illusion? An Empirical Study of Government Official Behaviors in
Takings, 6 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 541, 544 (2009) (ﬁnding that in Taiwan, local
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pensation reduces the possibility (and therefore the incentives) for government actors to utilize their taking power for corrupt purposes.39
When compensation does not accurately measure the costs imposed by
takings, the takings power can be misused or abused. This is no less true
when the taking is a partial one.
Unaccounted-for costs and beneﬁts are endemic to all takings and,
in particular, to partial takings. Many scholars have argued that standard
compensation formulas for all exercises of eminent domain fail to take
account of some kinds of subjective value enjoyed by owners.40 Additionally, government beneﬁts that accompany takings are generally not given
expression in compensation formulas.41 Finally, not all “takings” of
property are compensable. A complicated set of judicially crafted
formulas distinguish between, on the one hand, ordinary government
actions that take valuable property rights and attributes without the need
for compensation and, on the other hand, those that go “too far” and
become “regulatory takings” for which compensation must be paid.42
“Partial regulatory takings,” in particular, do not trigger a compensation
requirement, unless, like other regulatory actions, they go “too far.”43
governments are sensitive to political costs and beneﬁts when assessing land value); Daryl
J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 345, 377 (2000) (challenging the ﬁscal illusion
theory as a justiﬁcation for takings compensation).
39. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Hidden Function of Takings
Compensation, 96 Va. L. Rev. 1673, 1692–704 (2010).
40. E.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation Private, 59
Stan. L. Rev. 871, 872–73 (2007) [hereinafter Bell & Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation
Private]; James Geoffrey Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on Eminent
Domain, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 1277, 1292 (1985); John Fee, Eminent Domain and the Sanctity
of Home, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 783, 790 (2006); James J. Kelly, Jr., “We Shall Not Be
Moved”: Urban Communities, Eminent Domain and the Socioeconomics of Just
Compensation, 80 St. John’s L. Rev. 923, 940 (2006); James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin,
Public Ruses, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 859, 866; Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public
Use, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 61, 83 (1986); see also Laura H. Burney, Just Compensation and
the Condemnation of Future Interests: Empirical Evidence of the Failure of Fair Market
Value, 1989 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 789, 793–94.
41. See infra section I.B.1.
42. There is a vast literature on regulatory takings, including Steven J. Eagle,
Regulatory Takings (5th ed. 2012); Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the
Power of Eminent Domain (1985) [hereinafter Epstein, Takings: Private Property];
William A. Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics (1995); Lawrence
Blume, Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Perry Shapiro, The Taking of Land: When Should
Compensation Be Paid?, 99 Q.J. Econ. 71 (1984); Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson,
Regulatory Takings: When Should Compensation Be Paid?, 23 J. Legal Stud. 749 (1994);
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations
of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (1967); Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private
Property and Public Rights, 81 Yale L.J. 149 (1971).
43. John D. Echeverria, Partial Regulatory Takings Live, but . . . , in Taking Sides on
Takings Issues: The Impact of Tahoe-Sierra 67, 67 (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2002); Richard
A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 Stan.
L. Rev. 1369, 1377–78 (1993) [hereinafter Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina] (stating that
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These valuation problems associated with ordinary takings are even
more severe in the case of partial takings. Partial takings involve the
seizure of partial assets. This means that the seized property may have no
market in which value can be measured. In addition, the seizure of one
partial asset leaves behind a different partial asset. The effect of the
seizure on the partial asset left behind must also ﬁnd expression in
valuation formulae.
In sum, partial takings are both extremely popular and extremely
problematic. Partial takings are supported by the justiﬁcations supporting ordinary takings and troubled by the difficulties attending them. Yet,
partial takings also have unique aspects that make them both particularly
useful and unusually problematic. Ideally, the legal treatment of partial
takings would ameliorate these problems. Unfortunately, the law’s treatment of partial takings seems more likely to exacerbate them. It is to this
troubling feature of the law of partial takings that we now turn.
B.

Special Doctrines of Partial Takings

This section explores the judicial treatment of partial takings. Courts
have fashioned many special doctrines to deal with compensation for
partially taken parcels of land. The doctrines, as this section will demonstrate, deal with only some of the challenges partial takings pose. In some
ways, the doctrines may be said to worsen the already extant challenges.
As a preliminary matter, it is important to understand the conundrums posed by compensating for partial takings. In general, takings
compensation aims to give the owner of the taken property money in the
value of the taken property.44 Prima facie, if the state takes one-third of
Blackacre, it should give the owner one-third of the value of Blackacre.
But in reality, matters are not so simple. Blackacre may not be of consistent quality; part may be rocky, and the rest ﬂat. Moreover, taking onethird of Blackacre affects the value of the remaining two-thirds. It may no
longer be possible to use Blackacre in the same way as before—the lot,
for instance, may no longer be large enough to grow certain crops. And
new uses of Blackacre may now be possible—for example, the new road
created in part from the taken property may enable a new factory to get
products to the market cost efficiently. The relationship between the
partial taking and the value of what remains of Blackacre is a complex

partial takings, while virtually total in form, will remain uncompensated under the Court’s
current approach).
44. See Bell & Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation Private, supra note 40, at 872–
73; see also Patrick J. Rohan & Melvin A. Reskin, 8A Nichols on Eminent Domain § G18.02
(3d ed. 2017) [hereinafter 8A Nichols on Eminent Domain]; 4A Nichols on Eminent
Domain, supra note 1, § 14.01.
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one. This relationship is the source of a variety of special doctrines for
adjusting compensation awards in cases of partial takings.45
1. Offsets. — One of the most litigated questions of partial takings
compensation is the “offset.” In most cases, an “offset” reduces compensation for partial takings.46
To understand offsets, we must recall that all takings—not just partial takings—produce multiple effects, some positive, some negative.47
For instance, when the state uses the power of eminent domain to take
land to build a road, the landowners lose the assets taken by the state, but
the remaining owners gain the value of easier access to their land.
Indeed, given the constitutional requirement that takings be justiﬁed by
a “public use,”48 it is near impossible to think of a taking without an
accompanying beneﬁt to at least one person.49 In most cases, the law
treats the costs and beneﬁts entirely separately. The losses the owners
suffer as a result of the government’s takings are compensated. The
beneﬁts owners enjoy as a result of the government’s givings are overlooked.50
In the case of partial takings, however, matters are different. Under
both state and federal law of takings compensation, when deciding on
the compensation to award owners suffering a partial taking, courts take
into account both costs and beneﬁts.51 In the language of the law, compensation for the taking is “offset” by the value of the beneﬁt realized by
the owner. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that such offsets are
constitutional and do not run afoul of the constitutional requirement of
“just compensation” for takings.52
While it has a great deal of intuitive appeal, a doctrine of offsetting
compensation by the value of beneﬁts actually creates three different sets
of difficulties. First, the doctrine is difficult to apply. It is difficult enough
to measure land value;53 it is much tougher when the effects of government projects must be disentangled from all the other factors affecting
45. See generally 4A Nichols on Eminent Domain, supra note 1, § 14.03 (exploring
the special valuation issues associated with partial takings).
46. 3 Nichols on Eminent Domain, supra note 35, § 8A.02; 4A Nichols on Eminent
Domain, supra note 1, § 14.03.
47. Bell & Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, supra note 25, at 290.
48. U.S. Const. amend. V.
49. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 Yale L.J. 547, 565 (2001)
[hereinafter Bell & Parchomovsky, Givings] (“Thus, any taking must confer some beneﬁt
on the public.”).
50. Id. at 549.
51. 3 Nichols on Eminent Domain, supra note 35, § 8A.02; 4A Nichols on Eminent
Domain, supra note 1, § 14.03.
52. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 584 (1897). In some states, the beneﬁts may offset
only severance damages but not the compensation for the property taken. See, e.g., Done
Holding Co. v. State, 534 N.Y.S.2d 406 (App. Div. 1988); State v. Meyer, 403 S.W.2d 366, 374
(Tex. 1966); City of Richardson v. Smith, 494 S.W.2d 933, 940 n.4 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
53. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
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land value. All states eliminate from the offset valuation effects that are
not attributable to government action, and the version of the doctrine
most jurisdictions use involves an even more difficult exercise of linedrawing between government-created effects that are legally important
and those that are not. Second, the doctrine does not apply solely to partial takings but also to cases in which a landowner owns multiple parcels.
This means that application of the doctrine depends on the identity of
the landowner, rather than simply the nature of the asset.54 Third, and
ﬁnally, by offsetting beneﬁts only for partial taking compensation but not
for other takings or government actions, the doctrine actually creates a
perverse incentive. It encourages the state to prefer partial takings to
reduce the amount of compensation to be paid. Let us examine each of
these in turn.
The doctrine of offsets is not as simple as it sounds.55 At least in
some states, the compensation award is not adjusted for all beneﬁts realized by the owner. Courts draw a distinction between “special beneﬁts”—
beneﬁts that are “direct and peculiar to the particular property”56—and
“general beneﬁts,” which accrue to the many properties in the area.57 In
most states and at the federal level, courts reduce the compensation
award (or offset it, in the preferred terminology) by the value of special
beneﬁts realized by the owner of the taken property.58 The offset
doctrine thus beneﬁts the government in partial takings cases by allowing
it to pay less compensation than it would have to pay in ordinary takings.
However, the state reduces costs only to the extent of special, but not
general, beneﬁts created by the government project.
While it is easy to grasp the conceptual difference between special
and general beneﬁts, it is much harder to identify them in practice.
Consider, for instance, the case of Defnet Land & Investment Co. v. State ex

54. For those who support incorporating broader concerns of distributive justice into
eminent domain compensation awards, this can be seen as a feature, rather than a bug.
See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 Va. L. Rev. 741, 746 (1999).
However, it remains difficult to explain why the distributive justice concerns should enter
into the picture only in the case of partial takings. Cf. Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, In
Defense of Redistribution Through Private Law, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 326, 329 (2006)
(defending more broadly the use of private law to effect redistribution); Glynn S. Lunney,
Jr., Takings, Efficiency, and Distributive Justice: A Response to Professor Dagan, 99 Mich.
L. Rev. 157, 158 (2000) (arguing against Dagan’s proposal).
55. For a summary of the different state and federal approaches to offsets, see
generally 3 Nichols on Eminent Domain, supra note 35, § 8A.03.
56. United States v. Trout, 386 F.2d 216, 221–22 (5th Cir. 1967) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting United States v. 2,477.79 Acres of Land, 259 F.2d 23, 28 (5th Cir.
1958)).
57. Richardson v. Big Indian Creek Watershed Conservancy Dist., 151 N.W.2d 283,
286 (Neb. 1967) (“[G]eneral beneﬁts are those which arise from the fulﬁllment of the
public object which justiﬁed the taking . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Backer v. City of Sidney, 89 N.W.2d 592, 592 (Neb. 1958))).
58. 3 Nichols on Eminent Domain, supra note 35, § 8A.03.
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rel. Herman.59 The State of Arizona had decided to widen a highway, and
it therefore seized by eminent domain roughly thirteen acres of land
from a tract of 120.75 acres owned by the aggrieved landowner.60 The
state agreed to pay compensation for the taken land, as well as severance
damages, but it sought to offset the reward by applying the value of
“special beneﬁts” the land enjoyed due to the highway expansion.61
Speciﬁcally, the state argued that the remaining land was more valuable
because the highway expansion brought an interchange in close proximity to the affected land.62 The landowner challenged this argument on
the grounds that proximity to highway interchanges should never be
considered a “special” beneﬁt.63 The landowner also noted the oddities
of the particular case—that before receiving the “beneﬁt” of the widened
interstate highway, the land enjoyed direct access to a much longer
stretch of the unimproved highway, while the new interchange itself was
not located on the taken land but, rather, nearby on other taken land.64
The court rejected the landowner’s argument, ruling that proximity to
highway interchanges might or might not constitute special beneﬁts,
depending on the circumstances, including such matters as the amount
of traffic on the highway and the amount of distance from the interchanges.65 The rule, in other words, is that beneﬁts must be examined ad
hoc, and there are no ﬁrm guidelines for distinguishing the general from
the special beneﬁts.
With the distinction between special and general beneﬁts boiling
down to a fact-intensive but legally vague judicial determination, it is
unsurprising that disagreements between state and landowner are
frequent, and litigation common. The need to distinguish between the
effects of speciﬁc and general beneﬁts also complicates the appraisal
process, since appraisers must discern not only the degree to which a
property’s price has been affected by a taking but also the degree to
which other properties’ prices have been affected by the same taking.
A small number of jurisdictions have set aside the distinction
between special and general beneﬁts. For instance, in a controversial
recent decision,66 Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, the New Jersey
Supreme Court eliminated the long-standing distinction between general
59. 480 P.2d 1013 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971).
60. Id. at 1014–15.
61. Id. at 1015.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1019.
65. Id. at 1019–20.
66. See William J. Ward, NJ Supreme Court Overturns Karan, Changes Rules on Partial
Takings, N.J. Eminent Domain Blog (July 8, 2013), http://www.njeminentdomain.com/
state-of-new-jersey-nj-supreme-court-overturns-karan-changes-rules-on-partial-takings.html
[http://perma.cc/SS4W-3QC7] (describing the decision as opening “a virtual Pandora’s
box of issues for trial judges”).
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and special beneﬁts in New Jersey law and expanded the offset doctrine
to cover all beneﬁts engendered by any takings project.67 The case
involved the restoration of sand dunes.68 The Karans owned a singlefamily beachfront home in Harvey Cedars, New Jersey.69 As part of its
efforts to protect the beaches from erosion by rebuilding sand dunes, the
Borough of Harvey Cedars took a perpetual easement over roughly onequarter of the Karans’ property.70 The state sought to pay compensation
only for the actual reduction in value to the Karans’ property; this meant
that the compensation award would be offset by the value of all beneﬁts
that accrued to the Karans’ property, instead of just the “special
beneﬁts.” The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision in favor of the Karans and sided with the state, ordering the lower
measure of compensation.71 It remains to be seen whether New Jersey’s
approach will be adopted elsewhere in the United States.
The New Jersey approach can potentially make application of the
offset rule much easier. Applying this approach, one measures the value
of a partially taken property before the taking and after it.72 The difference between the two values is the amount that has to be paid in
compensation. If the remainder of the land has actually increased in
value after the taking, no compensation need be paid at all.73 Of course,
even this approach may pose logistical problems. It’s doubtful that the
affected realty was actually sold immediately before and after the taking,
making it more difficult to gauge the exact value of the property. Markets
for real estate never involve perfect substitutes, so measuring price is a
complex process.74 In addition, one has to account for other factors that
67. 70 A.3d 524, 526–27 (N.J. 2013).
68. Id. at 527.
69. Id. at 528.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 526–27.
72. To be sure, this is not as easy as it sounds. The land market is not like the stock market.
Thousands or even millions of identical stocks are bought and sold nearly continuously, such
that it is possible to measure the price of a share at any given time with a high degree of
precision. Land markets are much thinner—as there are many fewer buyers and sellers—and
the products being sold are never perfect substitutes. Cf. William Larson, Bureau of Econ.
Analysis, New Estimates of Value of Land of the United States 2 (Apr. 3, 2015) (unpublished
manuscript),
http://www.bea.gov/papers/pdf/new-estimates-of-value-of-land-of-the-unitedstates-larson.pdf [http://perma.cc/8727-U858] (discussing the difficulty of measuring the value
of land and proposing a model for evaluating the value of land).
73. But see Brittany Harrison, Note, The Compensation Conundrum in Partial Takings
Cases and the Consequences of Borough of Harvey Cedars, 2015 Cardozo L. Rev. de novo 31,
51–56, http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/denovo/HARRISON.36.denovo.pdf
[http://perma.cc/9FAG-DNTZ] (arguing the New Jersey ruling is equally compatible with
different valuation approaches).
74. See Peter Chinloy, Real Estate: Investment and Financial Strategy 25–47 (1988)
(describing various approaches to appraising property, such as the cost, market, incomecapitalization, and hedonic approaches); Riël Franzsen & William J. McCluskey, ValueBased Approaches to Property Taxation, in A Primer on Property Tax: Administration and
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affect the price of the property, as reﬂected in broader price movements
in the real estate market.75
Problems in measuring offsets are compounded by the peculiar
deﬁnition of “partial takings” for purposes of the offset doctrine. In most
jurisdictions, a taking is considered “partial” for purposes of the offset
doctrine so long as a portion of the owner’s land holdings is taken, even
if all the taken land consists of whole parcels.76 Consider, for instance, a
state decision to take a single parcel of land—Blackacre—in its entirety
to create a park. The park is sufficiently valuable that the four abutting
parcels of land—Whiteacre, Greyacre, Blueacre, and Greenacre—will all
double in value. For simplicity’s sake, let us assume that all ﬁve parcels
are of equal value, and all are worth $100,000. If each of the ﬁve parcels
were owned by a different person, the state would have to pay $100,000
in compensation to the owner of Blackacre to seize the land for the park.
However, if the owner of Blackacre also owned another parcel, say
Greyacre, the offset doctrine would view Blackacre–Greyacre as a single
parcel that had been partially taken. Thus, under the offset doctrine,
there would be no compensation: The $100,000 loss of Blackacre would
be offset by the $100,000 gain in value of Greyacre.
As our hypothetical taking of Blackacre illustrates, the offset
doctrine leads to two disturbing anomalies. First, the amount of compensation that must be paid for takings depends on the identity of the
aggrieved party, rather than on the property being taken. The
government’s taking of the same land, which is otherwise the same in all
particulars, in some cases will require a large compensation payment and
in others a small payment (or none at all) based on the identity of the
owner. Second, the ability of the government to recapture the value of its
givings depends on it taking property. If the government creates the park
on land it already owns, it cannot utilize the offset doctrine, but if it
seizes the land to create the park, the offset doctrine may be used to subsidize the seizure. This means that the government best preserves its
reservoir of land holdings by pairing its takings of land with projects that
Policy 41, 54–56 (William J. McCluskey, Gary C. Cornia & Lawrence C. Walters, eds., 2013)
(describing the complexities of valuation in general and speciﬁc difficulties arising from
the fact that “no two parcels are exactly alike”).
75. See Chinloy, supra note 74, at 27 (“Some problems with appraisal are posed by
inﬂation and its presence or absence . . . .”).
76. A similar rule is applied to partial regulatory takings. A regulation that deprives
some parcels of all their value, but leaves value in other parcels of the same owner, cannot
be considered a regulation that completely eliminates the value of a parcel, automatically
triggering a ﬁnding of a regulatory taking. Rather, such a regulation must be considered as
depriving all the parcels together of some of their value, thus requiring an indeterminate
and fact-intensive determination of whether the regulation went “too far” and became a
regulatory taking. See infra notes 183–196. See generally Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533
U.S. 606, 630–32 (2001) (noting the persistent difficulty of the denominator problem but
rejecting the petitioner’s assertion of total deprivation to a smaller parcel because the
issue was not presented in the petition for certiorari).
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create positive externalities for landholders. For government planners
with an eye on the budget, a project with such positive externalities is an
excellent opportunity to take land on the cheap, as long as the government remembers to take the land from holders of multiple parcels.
This leads us to the third and most serious problem with offsets: No
matter how perfectly the offsets are measured, they distort the incentives
of state officials making decisions about takings. Indeed, in some sense,
the more accurately the offset doctrine measures the effects of the taking, the worse the distortion of incentives.
Ordinarily, when the government takes property by eminent domain,
it owes compensation for the full value of the property taken, irrespective
of any benefits created.77 But if the offset rule applies, the amount of
compensation that must be paid drops drastically. Suddenly, the government may force the private citizen to pay a charge for the “giving”—the
beneﬁt it bestows upon the citizen.78 This means that the government will
pay less compensation and perhaps avoid having to pay at all. When the
offset rule applies, takings are dramatically cheaper for the government.
All things being equal, the government should always prefer takings in
which the offset rule applies to those in which it does not.
The offset rule may lead the government to conﬁgure projects in
such a way as to take advantage of the ability to reduce compensation by
offsetting gains. This creates an incentive for the government to prefer,
all things being equal, to seize parts of two parcels rather than one complete parcel. Likewise, the doctrine incentivizes the government to take
parcels from owners of multiple parcels, rather than to take all the
landholdings of a single owner.
2. Severance. — A second unique doctrine associated with partial takings is the severance damage rule.79 Under this rule, when an asset is
partially taken, the compensation is calculated in two steps. First, one
calculates the value of the partial asset taken. Second, one measures the
change in value of the partial asset that remains with the owner—the
“severance damage.” One then combines the two values to get the total
amount of compensation.80
The severance rule is not generally intended to be applied together
with an offset rule. Rather, it is used as a different approach to calculat77. 3 Nichols on Eminent Domain, supra note 35, § 8A.02(1) (noting “just
compensation” has generally been interpreted to mean “fair and adequate monetary
compensation for land actually taken, regardless of any beneﬁts to the remainder”); see
also Noel F. Delporte, Note, Beneﬁt as Legal Compensation for the Taking of Property
Under Eminent Domain, 16 St. Louis L. Rev. 313, 317–23 (1931) (discussing state
constitutional provisions that forbid using beneﬁts to offset compensation for land
takings).
78. See Fischel, supra note 42, at 80–84; Bell & Parchomovsky, Givings, supra note 49,
at 555–56, 596–97.
79. See 26 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Domain § 281 (2014).
80. 3 Nichols on Eminent Domain, supra note 35, § 8A.02(1).
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ing damages. To understand this, consider the ordinary use of the offset
rule. The offset rule is used when the primary measure of damages is the
difference between the value of the whole asset before the taking and the
partially remaining property after the taking.81 In such cases, the offset
rule clariﬁes that that difference in value is not the ﬁnal word on
compensation due; rather, the loss in value occasioned by the taking
must be “offset” by certain beneﬁts. By contrast, when the severance rule
is used, the primary measure of damages is the value of that portion of
the asset which is taken. Ideally, measuring damages by the value of taken
land plus severance damages should yield the same result as measuring
the value of the remaining land discounted by general beneﬁts. The
severance rule simply assures that proper account is taken of the impact
of the taking on the remaining property. As the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals noted, the different approaches (offset or severance) ultimately
seek to measure the same loss, but do so in different ways. Consequently,
setting compensation at the difference between property value before
and after taking (of the untaken parts of the asset) and then adding
extra compensation for “severance” can result in the payment of double
compensation.82 Said the court,
[A]s the government argues, if th[e] [“before and after method
of valuation”] is properly employed when there is a partial
taking, severance damages should not be allowed. This is so
because if the fair market value of the property after the taking
is subtracted from its fair market value before the taking, presumably the fair market value after the taking would reﬂect any
diminution in value by reason of the taking so that a separate
allowance for severance damages is unnecessary in order for the
landowner to recover just compensation.83
Theoretically, the severance rule should allow courts to avoid the
pitfalls of the offset rule and calculate damages more precisely. Unfortunately, reality is more complicated.84 Severance damages are almost
impossible to calculate. Measuring severance damages requires courts to
undertake the same task that frustrates them in measuring offsets: They
must ﬁgure out to what degree changes in asset value are attributable to
“severance” as opposed to other phenomena,85 such as changes in the
81. See supra section I.B.1; see also 1 Lewis Orgel, Valuation Under the Law of
Eminent Domain §§ 48–51 (James C. Bonbright ed., 2d ed. 1953) (comparing the three
formulas courts have used to measure “just compensation” for partial takings).
82. See United States v. 2.33 Acres of Land, 704 F.2d 728, 728 (4th Cir. 1983).
83. Id. at 730 (citing United States v. 38.60 Acres of Land, 625 F.2d 196, 201 (8th Cir.
1980)).
84. See Ashley Mas, Note, Eminent Domain Law and “Just” Compensation for
Diminution of Access, 36 Cardozo L. Rev. 369, 374–75 & n.31 (2014) (listing the
exceptions to the principle that all consequential damage to remaining parcels is
compensable).
85. See 4A Nichols on Eminent Domain, supra note 1, § 14.03 (addressing limitations
on the compensability of damage to remaining property).
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market or the general effects of a government action. Because the markets for partial assets are often thin, or even nonexistent, there is little
empirical basis on which courts can make such determinations. Instead
courts must try to infer the relative ﬁnancial impact of several causes by
various indirect measurements.
Additionally, even if courts feel conﬁdent enough to make a decision
about the economic impact of a severance, they must have a ﬁrm grasp of
the other pieces of the compensation puzzle. They must be able to
measure the value of the taken asset in such a way as to ensure full compensation but not double compensation.86
It is little wonder, therefore, that courts often choose the offset method
instead.
C.

The Problem with Partial Takings

While partial takings are both ubiquitous and necessary, they also
raise unique economic problems. Speciﬁcally, partial takings lead to
three characteristic difficulties. First, the division of a parcel between
state and owner creates a situation that may be prone to strategic misbehavior, such as extortion by the state. Second, in dividing parcels between
the state and the prior owner, partial takings may create new assets (posttaking parcels) that are suboptimally conﬁgured. For instance, while a
partial taking may enable a road, the partial taking may come at the price
of making an entire farm unusable. Third, because partial takings involve
dividing up existing parcels of land, they create new assets that may have
no clear market. This complicates efforts to value the asset taken.
Obviously, all three of these difficulties are related to one another.
The special doctrines discussed above do not fully address these
three problems, and in some ways, they even exacerbate them. Indeed,
the offset doctrine in particular creates a fourth problem with partial takings: Special doctrines incentivize the state to prefer partial takings over
complete takings.87 Indeed, the state may choose inefficient partial
takings over efficient complete takings or nonaction.
In this section we address each of these problems, in reverse order.
We begin with the artiﬁcial and undesirable incentive to engage in partial
takings created by the special doctrines.
1. The Artiﬁcial Incentive for Partial Takings. — The first problem that
arises in the context of partial takings is directly related to the offset rule. As
explained above, the offset rule allows the government to adjust downward
compensation awards by taking account of the positive effects of exercises
of eminent domain.88 The offset rule, however, applies only to partial
takings or takings of a portion of an owner’s larger set of holdings. When
86. See id. § 14.02(3)(b)(ii).
87. See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.
88. See supra section I.B.1.
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land holdings are taken in their entirety, no offset is possible. This, of
course, creates an incentive for the government to prefer partial takings
to total takings when both methods can achieve the government’s goals.89
As an illustration, consider the following example. Imagine that the
construction of a new highway exit increases the value of ten identical
contiguous commercial lots by 200% each on account of the increase in
the volume of traffic. Assume that the government can construct the new
exit either by taking four of the lots in their entirety or by taking 40% of
each of the ten lots. Assume, further, that the ﬁrst option—taking four
lots in their entirety—is more desirable from a planning standpoint; seizing the lots in their entirety would allow for a more compact exit, with
lower maintenance costs and superior safety. In the absence of the offset
rule, the government would clearly prefer to take the four entire lots.
This option would lead to better results at the same cost (or perhaps even
a lower cost, since the government would bear the administrative cost of
only four takings, rather than ten). Yet, under the current compensation
rules, the government has a strong ﬁnancial incentive to choose the
second, inferior option. While the inferior option would require the government to bear the cost of prosecuting ten eminent domain proceedings,
in each case, thanks to the offset rule, the government would avoid paying
any compensation. The offset rule, in other words, would render the
acquisition of private property by eminent domain essentially free, so long
as the government remembered to use partial takings.
In the extreme case, partial takings allow the state to take fee simple
ownership in land without paying compensation and without falling
afoul of the constitutional requirement to pay “just compensation” for
takings. But even in the less extreme cases in which the state does have to
pay compensation for a partial taking, the offset rule makes it likely that
the state will pay less than it would for similar assets taken by wholeparcel takings.
Naturally, the ability to seize ownership for no compensation or for
very little compensation distorts the government’s decisions on takings.
Simply put, when given the opportunity to take a lot and pay a little,
there are few who will resist to the opportunity to take.90
2. Compensation Problems. — Of course, the purpose of the offset rule
is not to distort government incentives. Rather, the offset rule (like the
severance rule) helps courts properly calculate compensation for partial
takings.91

89. See supra section I.B.
90. One does not need to hold to extreme versions of ﬁscal illusion to recognize that
budgetary considerations potentially impact government decisionmaking in some fashion.
See supra note 38.
91. See 4A Nichols on Eminent Domain, supra note 1, § 14.02[1] (noting that the
severance and offset rules “are merely tools to be used by the court or the jury in
determining the sometimes elusive question of what constitutes full or just compensation
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As we noted, compensation for eminent domain is already a difficult
task even when the taking is of a complete parcel. Compensation, as calculated by standard doctrines, ignores a number of important harms and
beneﬁts.92 The offset doctrine partially alleviates the failure to take
account of givings in ordinary exercises of eminent domain, but it does
so at the cost of distorting government incentives.93 Additionally, when
the offset doctrine discounts general beneﬁts, it forces courts to engage
in a fact-intensive inquiry into the character of different beneﬁts
remainder properties enjoy.94
Partial takings do not alleviate the ordinary difficulties in calculating
compensation; they exacerbate them. This is because partial takings
necessarily divide assets into new conﬁgurations. The old conﬁgurations
may have had thick or thin markets, but the new conﬁguration will
almost certainly have a thin market or none at all. Consider, for example,
the taking of a diagonal strip of land for a road, in such a manner as to
create two remainder parcels that are roughly triangular. Though the
new triangular parcels might have been created previously, they were not,
probably because there was little demand for them. While the demand
for such parcels might emerge at some time in the future, there is little
likelihood that such demand will emerge precisely at the time they are
created by the partial taking.95
in the case of partial taking”); see also Village of South Orange v. Alden Corp., 365 A.2d
469, 472 (N.J. 1976) (providing the formulas for the offset and severance methods and
noting that either may be used in New Jersey); Orgel, supra note 81, §§ 48–51 (noting the
three formulas courts use to determine partial takings compensation).
92. See Coniston Corp. v. Vilage of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir.
1988) (“Compensation in the constitutional sense is . . . not full compensation, for market
value is not the value that every owner of property attaches to his property but merely the
value that the marginal owner attaches to his property.”); see also Bell & Parchomovsky,
Taking Compensation Private, supra note 40, at 885–90; Durham, supra note 40, at 1278–
79; Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 957, 962–67
[hereinafter Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart]; Krier & Serkin, supra note 40, at
866; Merrill, supra note 40, at 82–85. In practice, “Many owners are ‘intramarginal,’
meaning that because of relocation costs, sentimental attachments, or the special
suitability of the property for their particular (perhaps idiosyncratic) needs, they value
their property at more than its market value.” Coniston, 844 F.2d at 472.
93. See, e.g., Russo, supra note 23, at 1552 (noting that as nineteenth-century
railroad companies “invested with the power of eminent domain [and] took advantage of
the ability to offset, some began to compensate landowners entirely in beneﬁts,” with
“[o]ne scholar report[ing] that railroad takings in Illinois frequently resulted in an award
of $1” (footnote omitted)); cf. 3 Nichols on Eminent Domain, supra note 35, § 8A.03(1)
(noting that offset rules vary depending “on whether beneﬁts may setoff damages to the
remainder or to the property taken and whether special or general beneﬁts may be
considered for setoff”).
94. Russo, supra note 23, at 1552. (“The early nineteenth century opinions made no
effort to classify beneﬁts as general or special, and the New York high court went so far as
to suggest that a landowner could be entirely compensated with beneﬁts.”).
95. Studies show that parcels with regular boundaries are more valuable than those
with irregular boundaries. See, e.g., Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, The Demarcation of
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To arrive at the correct compensation amount, judges must be able
to estimate the value of the giving received by the affected property
owners, the potential effects of future use by the government, and the
suitability of the remainder for standard uses. In addition, the judge
ought to be able to determine the harm the severance causes in those
cases in which such harm exists. This is a formidable task.
As one would expect, there could be signiﬁcant disagreement
between the government and the private property owners concerning the
appropriate compensation amount. Naturally, each party would attempt
to bolster its claims by hiring the services of land appraisers, and the
court would often be presented with divergent opinions as to what it
should do. At the end of the day, though, notwithstanding the court’s
best efforts and the amounts the parties expend, it is unrealistic to expect
the court to arrive at an accurate number. As a result, the amount
awarded may be excessive or undercompensatory,96 and the costs parties
incur simply in order to ﬁgure out how to allocate the value and loss of
the taking largely represent a pure loss from a social perspective.
3. Problematic Asset Conﬁgurations. — Even if the government could
ﬁgure out how to calculate compensation easily, partial takings would still
be problematic. Partial takings, by their nature, reconﬁgure assets. Part
of an asset is taken by the government and part is left behind, creating
two new smaller assets in place of the one larger one. But these new
assets may not be properly conﬁgured for optimal use. Naturally, the
asset held by the government is in a conﬁguration that the government
deems suitable for its use. But the part left in the hands of the private
owners in the aftermath of partial takings is often unsuitable for its pretaking use.97 At times, the remaining part is unﬁt for any economically
viable use.
This is especially true when the government takes a large percentage
of the original parcel. For instance, takings of over 50% of the original
parcel may result in the creation of remainders of very little use for their
owners. Naturally, the speciﬁc effect will also depend on the initial size of
the parcel that was subject to a partial taking. Very large parcels may
“survive” substantial partial takings without losing the lion’s share of
their value, whereas small parcels may see their value eviscerated even by
relatively small partial takings.

Land and the Role of Coordinating Property Institutions, 119 J. Pol. Econ. 426, 446–50
(2011); Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, Land Demarcation Systems, in Research
Handbook on the Economics of Property Law 257, 279–92 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E.
Smith eds., 2011).
96. Patricia Munch, An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain, 84 J. Pol. Econ. 473,
487–88 (1976) (ﬁnding pervasive under- and overcompensation in eminent domain cases
in Illinois).
97. For examples, see generally Richard E. Welch, Valueless Property: How a
Remainder Converts to a Remnant, Right Way Mag., Nov./Dec. 2009, at 36, 36–37.
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Another factor that affects the suitability of the remainder for future
use is the pertinent land use law. Speciﬁcally, minimum lot size and setback requirements can render the remaining parts unsuitable for
residential and commercial uses, dooming them to lie fallow if the
owners cannot secure a change in the zoning rules or an exemption.
Small size is not the only problem resulting from partial takings.
Partial takings may also create irregular-sized lots. The taking of a corner
of a lot for a park may create an “L”-shaped remainder lot, for example.
In other cases, partial takings may leave only a narrow sliver of the original lot, leading to the formation of “bowling alley” parcels. Needless to
say, such unorthodox conﬁgurations make the remaining parts almost
entirely unﬁt for conventional uses.
In a smoothly functioning market among willing buyers and sellers,
these kinds of asset conﬁgurations would not be of concern. Owners
would voluntarily subject their assets to such troublesome reconﬁgurations only if the newly enabled use were valuable enough to compensate
for the loss engendered by stunting the ability of the remaining parcel to
produce value. But exercises of eminent domain are not market
transactions; indeed, it is highly unlikely that the power of eminent
domain would be used if there were a smoothly functioning market in
which the government could buy the lots it needed.98 There is no guarantee that the partial taking is valuable enough to justify stunting the
remaining parcel. Indeed, there is no guarantee that the stunting was
necessary to achieve the purpose of the taking; perhaps the new use of
the taken property could be best achieved by using whole parcels, rather
than partially taken parcels.
4. Strategic Misbehavior. — A ﬁnal problem emanating from partial
takings is that they may induce strategic misbehavior on the part of the
government. The potential for strategic misbehavior is in large part the
result of the problems described above.
Consider again the differences between the compensation doctrine
applicable to partial and complete takings. The government can greatly
reduce the amount of compensation it will pay by carrying out a partial
rather than complete taking. But the government need not actually carry
out the partial taking. The threat of a partial taking can be employed in
order to convince owners to take less compensation.99
The possibility of strategic misbehavior does not end at the moment
of the partial taking. Oftentimes, the nature of the asset divided by the
partial taking is such that the newly divided assets continue to be strongly
linked. If Blackacre, a farm, is partially taken by the government, what
98. Even with the shortcomings in compensation for takings, the process of taking
property by eminent domain is costly, and likely more costly than negotiations in a
smoothly functioning market.
99. See Gideon Kanner, Condemnation Blight: Just How Just Is Just Compensation?,
48 Notre Dame Law. 765, 788–89 (1973).
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remains of Blackacre will be highly inﬂuenced by a government decision
to use its part as a waste facility, rather than a park. More generally, once
it has taken the asset part it needed and has paid compensation for it, the
government can threaten to use the taken part in ways that impose negative externalities on the owner of the remainder. Once again, the threat
can be employed to extract payment from owners (or, more likely, to
silence objections by the owners to other government actions).100
Consider the construction of a new highway. To enable the project,
the government must take several lots, in whole or in part. Thereafter, in
the event of partial takings, multiple remainders of various sizes will
remain in the hands of the original owners. Having paid compensation
to the owners, the government has discharged its legal duty. But, of
course, the payment of compensation does not terminate the relationship between the government and the owners of the taken property.
Subsequent to the takings, the government must decide what resources
to expend on the maintenance of the new highway. For example, the
government must decide whether to erect acoustic barriers between the
highway and the lots, how much to spend on upkeep and maintenance,
and how to develop the landscape. These and other decisions will have a
direct bearing on the value of the remainders.101
To be sure, similar strategic problems may arise in any case of
eminent domain. The government may threaten eminent domain in
order to extract favors. Or, once it has taken the property, the state may
threaten to use it in ways that are disadvantageous to owners of adjacent
lots. However, the strategic problem is particularly acute in the case of
partial takings. Partial takings, and the attendant compensation doctrines, give the government a number of tools for extortion. In some
cases, these tools may end up being used.
II. ADDING OPTIONS TO PARTIAL TAKINGS
In this Part, we suggest a new approach to partial takings that would
vest a put option in private property owners whenever the government
elects to engage in a partial taking. The creation of a put option would
bestow upon the private property owner the power to sell the remainder
of her partially taken asset to the government at a percentage of fair
market value of the asset as a whole at the time of the partial taking.

100. A related phenomenon is the strategic announcement of takings in order to take
advantage of “condemnation blight” and lower compensation amounts. See 8A Nichols on
Eminent Domain, supra note 44, § G18.02; Kanner, supra note 99, at 769; cf. T. Nicolaus
Tideman & Florenz Plassmann, Fair and Efficient Compensation for Taking Property
Under Uncertainty, 7 J. Pub. Econ. Theory 471, 474 (2005) (arguing such announcements
reduce property values and should require compensation).
101. Kanner, supra note 99, at 786–87 (discussing the need to indemnify condemnees
for damages).
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Formalization of this new entitlement would create a property
arrangement in which the parcel is divided (as the government desires in
effecting a partial taking), but either party can exercise the legal power
to effect a uniﬁcation of the title in the hands of the government. As
Professor Ian Ayres has pointed out, the government already holds a call
option on all private property by dint of its power of eminent domain.102
The power of eminent domain entitles the government to seize title to
any property, or part thereof, provided that it acts in the furtherance of a
public use and is willing to pay the private owner just compensation,
measured by fair market value.103 This proposal is intended to pair the
government’s broad call option with a much more limited put option
that would be conferred on private property owners in cases of partial
takings.
As is true of all options, private property owners would be under no
obligation to exercise their new legal entitlement. They would be free to
do so at their discretion. Importantly, the introduction of a put option
would result in a property arrangement that has the potential to ameliorate signiﬁcantly all the problems associated with partial takings. The put
option would encourage the reuniﬁcation of assets with respect to which
partial takings result in inefficient conﬁgurations. It would also create
strategic pressures on the owner to reach a more realistic assessment of
the value of the taking, while reducing the ability of the government to
engage in strategic misbehavior. If coupled with the elimination or
reform of the offset doctrine, this property arrangement would neutralize all the difficulties mentioned in the previous Part.
In order to explain our proposal, we begin with a brief review of the
intersection of the rich literature on options with the phenomenon of
takings. We then present the particulars of our proposed approach to
partial takings.
A.

The Use of Options in Property Law

The pertinent options come in two varieties. The ﬁrst, a call option,
allows the option holder to purchase an asset, entitlement, or future
commodity from a certain counterparty at a preagreed price or at a price
to be determined in the future.104 The second type, a put option, can be
thought of as the mirror image of a call option: It empowers the option
holder to sell a good, entitlement, or future commodity to a certain
counterparty at a preset price or a price to be decided in the future.105

102. See Ayres, Protecting Property, supra note 8, at 809 n.47.
103. See U.S. Const. amend. V; United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373–74 (1943)
(noting the courts’ adoption of “fair market value” as a measure of “just compensation”).
104. Ayres, Protecting Property, supra note 8, at 796.
105. Id.
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Options are often used to incentivize or suppress certain behaviors,106
align the interests of the parties,107 or to force parties to provide information.108 Options may also be used to effect a better ownership
structure or conﬁguration of assets.109 It is this use of options that is
especially pertinent for our purposes.
In recent years, scholars have used option theory to devise
innovative solutions to various property problems. This line of analysis
begins with Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed’s seminal insight that
all legal entitlements may be divided into three prototypes.110 The ﬁrst
prototype, property rule protection, vests in the entitlement holder the
power to set the price for takings or uses of her entitlement, and any
attempts to take the entitlement nonconsensually will be met with an
injunction.111 The second prototype, liability rule protection, bestows the
price-setting power not on the entitlement holder but rather on some
third party, such as a legislator, court, or administrative agency, which
means that transgressions will be met with a damages award that may fall
way short of the asking price of the entitlement holder.112 Finally, the
third prototype, inalienability rules, puts the entitlement outside the
sphere of market transactions and forbids the entitlement holder to sell
her entitlement to others even for a price of her choosing.113

106. See Ian Ayres, The Bill of Options?, in Optional Law: The Structure of Legal
Entitlements 1, 8 (2005) [hereinafter Ayres, The Bill of Options?]; Madeline Morris, The
Structure of Entitlements, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 822, 824 (1993); see also Gideon
Parchomovsky & Endre Stavang, The Green Option, 99 Minn. L. Rev. 967, 997 (2015)
(explaining how call options can be used to incentivize large businesses to act in a more
environmentally responsible way).
107. See, e.g., John Core & Wayne Guay, The Use of Equity Grants to Manage Optimal
Equity Incentive Levels, 28 J. Acct. & Econ. 151, 152 (1999) (“[F]irms actively manage
grants of new equity incentives to CEOs in response to deviations from an optimal level of
equity incentives.”); Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of Corporate
Ownership: Causes and Consequences, 93 J. Pol. Econ. 1155, 1174–75 (1985) (explaining
that shareholder choice to broaden ownership can enhance proﬁts); Michael C. Jensen &
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 336 (1976) (arguing option contracts can be
used to align managerial and shareholder incentives and maximize ﬁrm value).
108. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1399, 1404
(2005) (discussing how options may be employed to reveal private information); Saul
Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law, 68 Va. L. Rev. 771, 779
(1982) (explaining how the grant of call options to third parties may induce truthful
reporting of property values for property tax purposes).
109. See, e.g., Symphony Space, Inc. v. Pergola Props., Inc., 669 N.E.2d 799, 806 (N.Y.
1996) (explaining that “options ‘appendant’ or ‘appurtenant’ to leases—encourage the
possessory holder to invest in maintaining and developing the property by guaranteeing
the option holder the ultimate beneﬁt of any such investment”).
110. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 30, at 1092.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1092–93.
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Drawing on the Calabresi-Melamedean framework, property theorists
have analogized liability rule protection to call options.114 As an illustration, consider a classic pollution dispute. Assume a factory that emits
smoke, depositing soot on a residential lot. Assume further that the law
wishes to protect the entitlement of the resident to fresh air, free of
pollutants. In this case, the law can either grant the resident property
rule protection or liability rule protection. Under a property rule, the
residential property owner will have an absolute right to block the
emissions and win an injunction in court against the factory continuing
to emit smoke. A liability rule, on the other hand, will allow the court to
set the price of the pollution; the resident will win money damages to
compensate her for the harm she suffers, but the factory will continue to
emit smoke and soot.
Professor Carol Rose colorfully explained the policy choice in the
following way:
[Under a property rule regime], the entitlement holder has the
whole meatball, so to speak, and the other party has nothing—
one has property, the other has zip. Under either of the two
liability rules, on the other hand, the meatball gets split: The
factory has an option to pollute (or once exercised, an
easement), while the homeowner has a property right subject to
an option (or easement).115
The value of employing options in property law has not escaped other
property theorists. Even Professor Richard Epstein, generally a champion
of strong property rule protection for property interests,116 has acknowledged the value of employing call options with respect to property in
some cases. Speciﬁcally, Epstein has written of the utility of liability rules
as a means of overcoming holdout problems and cases of bilateral
monopoly that thwart voluntary exchange, noting that “liability rules,
when used, always take the direction of a ‘call’ [option].”117
Ayres took the next logical step by suggesting the potential utility of
put options as well. Ayres illustrated his analysis within the common
framework of a pollution lawsuit. To begin with, Ayres explained the
creation of options as a two-step process.118 In step one, a party takes or
compromises the property interest of another, as in the case of the

114. See e.g., Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 Yale L.J. 703, 729–33 (1996); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley,
Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 Yale
L.J. 1027, 1041–46 (1995).
115. Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 Yale L.J. 2175, 2178–79 (1997).
116. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of
Property Rules, 106 Yale L.J. 2091, 2120 (1997) (“The choice between property rules and
liability rules should normally be resolved in favor of the former . . . .”).
117. Id. at 2093.
118. Ayres, Protecting Property, supra note 8, at 800.
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factory that emits pollutants onto a neighboring lot.119 Once the initial
partial taking occurs, an option is created if a court decides to grant the
affected property owner liability rule protection. By setting an amount of
damages to be paid by the taker, the court effectively gives the taker a
choice between exercising the option at the price set by the court and
thereby appropriating the underlying entitlement or refraining from
exercising the option at said price by stopping and restoring the status
quo ante.
Extending the analysis to puts, Ayres noted that after the initial
transgression occurs, courts have another option at their disposal: They
can empower the harmed property owner to sell her interest to the
transgressor at the price set by the court.120 Ayres explained that the use
of put options has different distributional and informational effects than
the use of calls. Puts place the decisionmaking power in the hands of the
harmed party, as opposed to the aggressor, allowing her to perform the
relevant cost-beneﬁt analysis and to exercise the option only when doing
so inures to her beneﬁt.121
As an example of the use of options in current property doctrine,
Ayres turned to the doctrine of encroachment. An encroachment occurs
when a land owner erects a structure that projects into or fully stands on
her neighbor’s property.122 Traditionally, the common law dealt with
encroachment by granting property rule protection to the encroachedupon party and issuing an injunction against the encroacher even when
the encroachment happened in good faith.123 The case of Pile v. Pedrick124
provides a powerful, albeit extreme, illustration. There, the foundations
of the defendant’s factory wall projected by one-and-three-eighths inches
onto the plaintiff’s property.125 The encroachment resulted from a
surveyor’s error of which the defendant was not aware.126 Despite the fact
that the encroachment was both de minimis and in good faith, the court
ordered the defendant to remove the offending portion of the wall.127 As
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 804–13 (discussing the distributional, informational, and bid–ask spread of
puts).
122. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Introduction to Property 40 (2d ed. 2005).
123. See, e.g., James L. Kainen, The Historical Framework for Reviving Constitutional
Protection for Property and Contract Rights, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 87, 134 (1993) (noting
that “[u]nder the common law of the early nineteenth century . . . when an owner
vindicated his title to the land by ejecting the improver from possession, his title was held
to encompass title to the improvements”); Deepa Varadarajan, Improvement Doctrines, 21
Geo. Mason L. Rev. 657, 669 (2014) (“Under the conventional common law view, the
mistaken improver of land was not entitled to any compensation from the landowner for
the improvement.”).
124. 31 A. 646 (Pa. 1895).
125. Id. at 647.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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the plaintiff was not willing to sell the tiny bit of land to the defendant,
nor to permit the defendant entry to chip away the small portion of the
offending foundations, the defendant had no choice but to remove the
wall in its entirety.128
Over time, the law has shifted away from the dogmatic approach of
the common law. A growing number of states have modified the traditional
approach statutorily by empowering courts to use liability rule protection
in cases of good-faith encroachments, in which the encroacher did not
know and was not supposed to know that she encroached on her
neighbor’s land and in which the value of the encroaching structure far
exceeds the value of the underlying land.129 In such cases, certain states
vest power in the courts to give the encroacher an option to buy the
affected land strip from the victim at a price the court sets—a call option
solution.130 Other states have gone even further by recognizing an option
in good-faith encroachers to force a sale of the structure upon the
encroached-upon neighbor—a put option solution.131
The modern approach to encroachments provides a natural launching pad for our proposed reform of the doctrine of partial takings. After
all, encroachments that are authorized without the consent of the owner
are nothing more (or less) than partial private takings.132
We propose an expansion of the number of options already created
in the context of partial takings. In addition to the options already
inherent in the nature of the taking, we suggest adding a new put option,
as we will describe in greater detail in the next section. The option we
propose provides a simple but elegant way to ameliorate the harsh results
of property rules without excessively disturbing the overall structure of
entitlements.
B.

An Option-Based Mechanism for Addressing Partial Takings

In this section, we propose an options mechanism that should
accompany all partial takings. The aim of the mechanism is simultaneously to alleviate the central weakness of partial takings—the danger
that partial takings might result in suboptimal partitions of parcels or
titles that adversely affect land value—and to ameliorate or avoid the
appraisal problems that plague partial takings. The options mechanism
we propose addresses the former issue by giving the private owner the
ability to reunify an affected parcel at a price that is partially predeter128. Id.
129. See, e.g., Kelvin H. Dickinson, Mistaken Improvers of Real Estate, 64 N.C. L. Rev.
37, 42 n.28 (1985) (reporting that at least forty-two states have adopted versions of such acts).
130. Id. at 65–68.
131. E.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 871.1–.7 (West 2015).
132. See generally Abraham Bell, Private Takings, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 517, 519 (2009)
(arguing “takings carried out by non-governmental actors . . . have long existed, in some
form or another, in our legal system”).
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mined. By linking the price of uniﬁcation to compensation for the partial
taking, our mechanism also incentivizes parties to provide information
that eases the task of determining the correct compensation for the
initial partial taking.
In our proposal, every partial taking would be accompanied by the
creation of a put option that complements the call option the government already has. The put option of private property owners would arise
immediately upon the announcement of a partial taking and would have
to be exercised within a short time—we propose three months. The price
of exercising the option—the “strike price”—would be set by two factors:
the market values set at the time of the partial taking and a ratio
speciﬁed by the court at the time of the partial taking. The ratio, in turn,
would be set by the court on the basis of the market prices of the asset as
a whole and the portion taken.
To illustrate how our proposal would work, consider the following
example. Assume that the government announces a plan to take a portion of Beth’s parcel in order to add another lane to an interstate
highway. Ordinarily, the court would examine the value of Beth’s parcel
and the portion taken thereof, announce a compensation award for the
partial taking, and grant the government title for the portion. Under our
proposal, the court’s order would be slightly more detailed. The court
would not only announce the value of the portion taken, but it would
also announce the value of Beth’s parcel as a whole. For purposes of illustration, let us imagine that Beth’s parcel is appraised at $500,000 and the
portion taken is appraised at $100,000. This would mean that the court
found that the portion taken was worth 20% of the whole parcel. As in an
ordinary taking, the government would pay $100,000 and receive title to
the portion of Beth’s parcel it desires.
At this point, a put option would be granted to Beth to force a sale
of the remainder of her lot to the government. The option would allow
Beth a three-month period during which she could force the government
to buy the remainder of her parcel at a price equal to 80% of the value of
the parcel as a whole, or $400,000. It is important to note that the formalization of a put option in Beth creates symmetry between private
property owners and the government. Indeed, as Ayres explained, the
government, on account of its eminent domain power, already has a call
option over all private property, with the exercise price being fair market
value.133 In principle, therefore, had the government wanted, it could
have seized the entirety of Beth’s parcel and paid her $500,000, invoking
the same public use purpose that enabled the partial taking.134
133. Ayres, The Bill of Options?, supra note 106, at 4.
134. While the government would have to show a “public use” for the remainder,
under current law, the government can point to almost anything as a public use justifying
the taking. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483–84 (2005) (“For more
than a century, our public use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and
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The central feature of our proposal is thus to give both sides the
ability to force the unity of asset. The symmetric ability to force unity of
the asset not only encourages maintaining asset unity when it is more
valuable but also eliminates the strategic incentive to seize partial assets
when it is possible to offload uncompensated costs on the remaining
parcel. In essence, the options force the government to evaluate the costs
of a partial taking that would otherwise fall on the owner.
C.

The Advantages of the Proposed Model

Our proposal offers four advantages over the current legal regime.
First, our proposal creates a readily available mechanism for reuniting
the title to the lot as a whole in the hands of a single owner, thereby
preempting the creation of negative externalities that tend to arise in
cases of split ownership. Second, and relatedly, it prevents the creation of
parcels that are suboptimally conﬁgured for use. Third, our mechanism
creates an incentive for the government to engage in more efficient
planning and land development policies. Fourth, our proposal may save
costs, relative to the existing rule, by simplifying the appraisal of the
value of the part that remains in the hands of the private owner after the
taking.
Let us examine each of these advantages in turn.
1. Improved Asset Conﬁguration. — The proposal’s ability to unify
parcels is straightforward. Indeed, this is its central feature. Under our
proposed regime, both government and owner have the ability to force
reuniﬁcation of a parcel split by a partial taking. This means that when
one or the other of the parties believes the division to be suboptimal,
either can force the uniﬁcation. At the same time, the mechanism does
not require the pretaking parcel conﬁguration to remain forever. If the
decision satisﬁes the parties, they can allow the options to lapse, and the
parcels will have successfully been reconﬁgured. Thus, the proposal
encourages unity only when one or the other party foresees a beneﬁt
from unity. It is only when a government taking threatens to leave the
remainder unﬁt for use, or suboptimally conﬁgured for use, that the
owner will exercise her put option to stop this result from occurring.
While the owner would be unable to block the taking—that is the nature
of eminent domain—the owner would be able to decide whether she is
better off with the remaining partial parcel or the compensation. The
government would not necessarily be saddled permanently with the
remainder asset either. If the government could ﬁnd a buyer for the
remainder of the parcel, it could transfer the remainder to someone able
to make productive use of it.
2. More Accurate Compensation. — The ability to force unity of the
parcel, together with the option to leave the partial taking in place,
intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what
public needs justify the use of the takings power.”).
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points to our proposal’s second advantage. The reason an owner would
choose to exercise the put option and force a taking of the remainder is
either some ﬂaw in the compensation scheme that ensures overcompensation for the remainder or a ﬂaw in the conﬁguration of the remainder
that makes it difficult to use or sell. While ﬂaws in the compensation
scheme are certainly possible (as we shall discuss momentarily), it is
reasonable to conjecture that the bulk of cases exercising the put option
will involve a ﬂawed conﬁguration of the remainder. Flaws in the
compensation scheme can be rectiﬁed with cash payments, without
passing title; transferring title can be costly and traumatic. The owner’s
put option will likely be exercised only when the remainder cannot be
put to more productive use.
3. Incentivizing Improved Government Decisionmaking. — The third
advantage of our proposal is its effect on government decisions. Strictly
speaking, our proposal is not necessary for the government to have a call
option on the remainder. Thanks to the government’s power of eminent
domain, in all cases of partial takings, the government could have taken
the remainder if it had so desired, and it can always pick up the remainder later.135 Accordingly, the decision to take only a part implies that,
from the government’s perspective, a partial taking (coupled with partial
compensation) is preferable to a complete taking (accompanied by full
compensation). As we explained, the government’s cost-beneﬁt calculus
is not necessarily aligned with the preference of the property owner and
does not necessarily reﬂect the broad societal interest.136 Yet, under
current law, the government has the power to force its preference on the
owner of the partially taken property, and the owner has no real say in
the matter.
The creation of a put option in the property owner, per our
proposal, will change the balance of power between the government and
private property owners. It would allow property owners, who wish to do
so, to force a sale of the remainder of the lot to the government in cases
of partial takings. The formalization of a put option that would complement the government’s already-existing call option will necessarily
change the calculus the government performs when it considers whether
to carry out a partial taking or a full taking. On the most basic level, it
will force the government to take account of the cost that its choice will
impose on property owners. Knowing that private property owners whose
land was partially taken will be able to sell the remainder to the government will induce the government to engage in more socially optimal
partial takings and in appropriate cases take the whole lot ab initio.
Relatedly, our proposal neutralizes some of the problematic incentives current partial takings doctrine creates. As we noted, the offset
doctrine creates a peculiar incentive for the government to seek partial
135. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
136. See supra section I.C.4.
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takings in place of total takings.137 It is only when the taking is considered
“partial” that the government has the ability to reduce compensation
awards by taking into account the positive effects of government projects
on property values. Under our proposal, this perverse incentive is greatly
diminished.138 Courts grant all partial takings compensation awards
against the background of an assessment of the value of the parcel as a
whole. While courts may still use the offset and severance doctrines to
establish the value of the partial taking, such evaluations ultimately must
be anchored by the value of a complete taking; if there is a signiﬁcant
enough divergence, one or the other of the parties will almost certainly
exercise the put or call option to translate the partial taking into a complete one.
4. Reduced Administrative Costs. — The fourth and ﬁnal advantage of
our proposal can be found in the savings it produces in administrative
and assessment costs. While our proposal leaves courts in the unenviable
position of measuring the value of partially taken property, it holds out
the possibility of cheaper and more accurate assessments of value.
To begin with, the options signiﬁcantly reduce the incentives for the
parties to misstate the value of a partial taking. Prima facie, one may
argue that our proposal invites the government to secure artiﬁcially low
appraisals of the value of properties it plans to take. A second look shows
this is not the case. It is under current doctrine that the government has
an incentive to “depress” the value of taken properties, irrespective of
whether it takes in whole or in part. Budgetary constraints invariably
induce the government to try to lower the compensation amount it must
pay to aggrieved property owners. Our proposal, however, greatly reduces
the advantage of artiﬁcially low assessments of the value of the part of the
property that is taken in partial takings. If the assessment of the portion
taken is too low while the assessment of the property as a whole is
roughly accurate, this will all but ensure that the property owner exercises the put option. As for the danger of artiﬁcially low appraisals of the
entire parcel, there is an easy and well-established ﬁx. As is the case
under current takings law, property owners have the right to challenge
the government assessment and produce an appraisal of their own.139
137. Bell & Parchomovsky, The Uselessness of Public Use, supra note 10, at 1440–43;
see also supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text.
138. As we have argued elsewhere, the government is best incentivized when the value
of beneﬁts is taken into account. Indeed, we proposed a general rule of assessing a charge
for all government givings. Bell & Parchomovsky, Givings, supra note 49, at 577. However,
as we noted there, it is a mistake to require givings charges only in the context of offsets to
takings. By restricting givings charges to offsets for takings, the law perversely encourages
the government to take property unnecessarily. Id. at 589.
139. Dana & Merrill, supra note 38, at 171 (describing the process under which
property owners can challenge the government’s appraisal of their land); Joe Palazzolo,
Obtaining Land for Trump’s Border Wall a Daunting Task, Experts Say, Wall St. J. (Mar.
16, 2017), http://www.wsj.com/articles/obtaining-land-for-trumps-border-wall-a-dauntingtask-experts-say-1489687484 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (“Property owners can
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Should the parties fail to reach an amicable resolution, a court will have
to step in and determine the fair market value. In such cases, it will be
only upon the issuance of a judicial determination that the property
owner will get to exercise her put option. While there is no guarantee
that appraisals of the value of the parcel as a whole will be accurate, as
noted, there is reason to believe that such appraisals will be better than
those of segments of the parcel with no clear market.140
One might voice a concern over the fact that our proposal increases
the cost of planning for the government. Under our proposal, whenever
the government engages in a partial taking, it will have to bear in mind
that the private owner might choose to exercise her put option, forcing
the government to pay the full market value of the property, even though
it needs only part of it. Although this argument is correct, it misses the
mark. For while it is true that the total amount paid by the government
will increase, so will the amount of land the government will have at its
disposal. Importantly, the government will be able to use the land to its
own ends or resell any parts in which it has no interest to third parties. In
other words, the government will be able to use and dispose of the taken
property as any private owner would. The only marginal cost our scheme
imposes on the government consists of the transaction costs that the
government will incur should it choose to transfer its title. It is critical to
understand that, under current law, that same cost must be borne by the
private property owner who wishes to sell her remainder.
On a similar note, one might claim that the ultimate result of the
exercise of put options by the owner will lead to excessive holdings of
property by the state. Indeed, almost by deﬁnition, the put will force the
state to take ownership of properties it did not express any interest in
acquiring. Nonetheless, there is little reason to fear that this will ultimately lead to excessive landholdings by the state. The state already has
impressive powers to acquire property, including the right to purchase
property and to take it by eminent domain. The state’s landholdings are
vast—the federal government owns more than a quarter of all lands in
the United States (considerably more in several states),141 and state and
local governments also own vast amounts of land.142 At the same time, the
ﬁle their own appraisals if they disagree with the government’s estimate, but they have to
pay their own legal and expert fees.”).
140. Appraisals of the parcel in its entirety can rely upon valuation information from
sources such as previous sales and tax appraisals. These sources will be unavailable for
appraisals of portions of parcels.
141. Carol Hardy Vincent et al., Cong. Research Serv., R42346, Federal Land
Ownership: Overview and Data 6 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42346.pdf
[http://perma.cc/2KXY-4DSX].
142. See Nat. Res. Council of Me., Public Land Ownership by State 1–2,
https://www.nrcm.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/publiclandownership1.pdf [http://
perma.cc/8RY7-Q9XP] (last visited Sept. 22, 2017) (detailing, by both acreage and
percentage of total state land, the amount of land owned by each of the ﬁfty states); see
also Nat’l Park Serv., Land Ownership in National Park System Units in Alaska and
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state has the ability to sell property it does not desire, and it seems odd to
fear that the state will end up holding too many lands because it has been
forced to purchase lands it does not want to hold.143
One might also voice a concern over the potential manipulation of
the put option by the owner. Owners will exercise the put option, inter
alia, when there are few good market options for disposing of the
remainder. One might object that this opens the process up to manipulation; owners will seek a government taking when compensation exceeds
market price or when in need of liquidity. The put option can force the
taking of the remainder of the property without the need to engage in
lobbying (or more corrupt practices). Here again, while the argument is
correct, it is more aptly aimed at the practice of eminent domain. When
compensation practices are flawed, all government takings are vulnerable
to corruption.144 The put and call options do not increase this vulnerability.
III. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS
In this Part, we consider several potential objections to our model.
First, we consider whether our model is well suited to small takings, and
we suggest the possibility of introducing a de minimis exception into our
model, which would exempt very small takings from triggering the put
option mechanism. Second, we consider the possible impact of our proposal on state holdings of land and, in particular, whether the result
would be excessive state holdings.
In the background of this discussion, it is important to bear in mind
the constitutional framework limiting state actions regarding takings.
The formal constitutional limitations on the takings power are found in
the Fifth Amendment.145 The two formal constitutional preconditions for

Possibilities for Mining and Other Developments 24, 26, https://www.nps.gov/subjects/
alaskaparkscience/upload/aps-13-2.pdf [http://perma.cc/8FENGG35] (last updated
Sept. 14, 2017) (stating that Alaska owns approximately 355,331 acres of land within the
National Park System); Nat’l Park Serv., Nonfederal Lands Within the National Seashore
81, https://www.nps.gov/caco/learn/management/upload/nonfederallands.pdf [http://
perma.cc/PLZ8-LHBS] (last visited Sept. 20, 2017) (stating that over 30% of the land in
the national seashore is owned by nonfederal public entities); Wash. State Recreation &
Conservation Office, Statewide Proﬁle 1 (1999), https://www.rco.wa.gov/documents/
plip/county_profiles.pdf [http://perma.cc/E854-BW8Z] (highlighting that in Washington,
the state and local governments own over four million acres of land, which is just over 10% of
all land within the state).
143. We address this issue in greater detail below. See infra section III.B.
144. See infra section III.B.
145. Obviously, we are referring here to the national Constitution. Some state
constitutions contain additional restrictions on the takings power. See Donna M. Nakagiri,
Taking Provisions in State Constitutions: Do They Provide Greater Protections of Private
Property than the Federal Takings Clause 3 (Jan. 1, 1999) (unpublished student research
paper, Michigan State University College of Law), https://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=king (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
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a taking of property are that the property must be taken for a “public
use” and that “just compensation” must be paid to the owner.146
However, there is a gap between these formal requirements and the
actual law. In the law as it has been interpreted by the Supreme Court,
the public use requirement has practically been read out of existence.
Under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, any purpose that is legitimate for government action is a “public use” that can justify the exercise
of eminent domain to take property. Thus, for example, the Court stated
in its 1954 decision Berman v. Parker, “Once the object is within the
authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of
eminent domain is clear. . . . Once the object is within the authority of
Congress, the means by which it will be attained is also for Congress to
determine.”147 Upholding the rule of Berman v. Parker in its 1984 decision
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, the Court insisted that “[t]he ‘public
use’ requirement is . . . coterminous with the scope of a sovereign’s
police powers,” and “where the exercise of the eminent domain power is
rationally related to a conceivable public purpose,” the Court will uphold
its constitutionality.148 In its 2005 decision, Kelo v. City of New London, the
Supreme Court approved of the Berman-Midkiff line of authority, citing
both cases before stating that “[f]or more than a century, our public use
jurisprudence has wisely . . . afford[ed] legislatures broad latitude in
determining what public needs justify the use of the takings power.”149
At the same time, the Court has developed a different and unexpected set of restrictions on the state’s power to take property. The Fifth
Amendment requires the payment of just compensation only when
property is “taken” but not when it is otherwise diminished in value. Had
it wished, the Court might have left legislatures near-absolute discretion
in determining what a “taking” is, just as legislatures now enjoy nearplenary authority in determining what constitutes a “public use.” Had
the Court chosen this course, the state would be required to pay just
compensation only if it labeled its action an exercise of the power of
eminent domain but not if it chose to describe its action in terms of the
government’s regulatory or taxing powers. In the landmark 1922 case
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, the Court decided to limit the discretion
146. U.S. Const. amend. V; Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 231–32
(2003).
147. 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
148. 467 U.S. 229, 240–41 (1984). As Professor Ellen Frankel Paul notes,
[T]he court’s meaning [is] unmistakable. . . . [T]he eminent domain
power is as broad as the police power: whatever legislatures can regulate,
they can also take. . . . Why is this so signiﬁcant? Because if the police
power is virtually unlimited in its purview (as, indeed, it has been since
the Court abandoned substantive due process in the late 1930s), then so
is eminent domain. This in effect, reads the public use clause as a
limitation on government takings, out of the Fifth Amendment.
Paul, supra note 16, at 101 (1987).
149. 545 U.S. 469, 483 (2005).
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of the state in deciding when a government action is a taking.150 Laying
the groundwork for what would become known as the law of “regulatory
takings,” the Court ruled that government regulation of property may be
deemed a “taking” if it goes “too far,” even if the legislature refuses to
call the action an exercise of eminent domain.151 Regulatory takings law
determines when the government has gone too far, and courts must consider the action a taking, even though not labeled an act of eminent
domain.152
The result of judicial glosses on the Fifth Amendment is thus best
understood as placing two limitations on government takings. First, while
the state has near-absolute discretion in deciding when to exercise the
power of eminent domain, its choice to refuse to label an action
“eminent domain” will sometimes be disregarded by courts, based on the
complex doctrines of the law of regulatory takings. Second, if the state
does “take” property—whether due to a declared exercise of eminent
domain or due to an action deemed a “regulatory” taking—it must pay
just compensation to the aggrieved owner.
A.

De Minimis Takings

The constitutional framework for takings law is crucial to bear in
mind when considering a ﬁrst potential objection to our proposal. Some
might argue that our proposal is overkill. It requires the state to offer a
put option to landowners, creating the possibility that the state will be
forced to acquire the entire asset, even when the state takes only a trivial
portion of the property.
The rigidity of the Supreme Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence reinforces this objection. The Supreme Court has steadfastly held
to the view that any permanent physical occupation, slight though it may
be, constitutes a taking for constitutional purposes (and, thus, a taking
for which just compensation must be paid). Recall the case of Loretto,
which involved a municipal ordinance requiring that landlords not interfere with the placement of hardware and cables for cable television
service on private residential property.153 The ordinance in question did
not use the term “eminent domain;” it was, by all appearances, merely a
regulation of property management. Moreover, the physical objects,
whose placement the ordinance mandated, occupied only a few square
inches of the building’s exterior.154 Nonetheless, the Court clung to the
rule that a physical taking of any size demanded the payment of just
compensation.155 In that particular case, the New York Court of Appeals,
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

260 U.S. 393, 415–16 (1922).
Id. at 415.
See infra section IV.C.
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 423 (1982).
Id. at 422; id. at 454 n.11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 421 (majority opinion).
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upon remand, upheld the power of the commission to determine just
compensation of a single dollar.156
The rule that any permanent physical occupation constitutes a compensable taking poses a challenge to our proposal. In its basic form, our
model would empower owners who suffered minor permanent intrusions
to force a sale of their entire interest to the government. Such a result is
undesirable from a social standpoint. Most minor intrusions and occupations do not affect the characteristics or marketability of the underlying
asset. Nor do they create a risk of strategic abuse on the part of the
government. Hence, triﬂing incursions do not normally necessitate a
transfer of ownership to the government.
To reﬂect this fact, we propose that de minimis takings be exempted
from our model. To operationalize this exemption, we would grant the
government, in appropriate cases, the power to seek in court a declaratory judgment that its actions would result in a de minimis taking—an
occupation that causes only a token harm to the owner. The owner, for
her part, would receive an opportunity to convince the court that the
occupation would occasion upon her more than a de minimis harm.
Should the court grant the government its request and classify the taking
as de minimis, no put option would be given to the owner, and, a fortiori,
she would not be able to exercise it. On the other hand, if the court were
to reject the government’s claim that the occupation at hand is merely de
minimis, the owner would receive a put option and would be entitled to
exercise it at her will within the three-month window.
Whether a particular occupation counts as a de minimis taking
would depend on the value of the property taken and the taking’s effect
on the use and marketability of the property. By our lights, a case like
Loretto would clearly come within the de minimis exception and would
not vest a put option in the property owner. Other physical occupations
whose impact exceeded that of Loretto would be judged based on their
circumstances. It can be added that the partial takings examples we
discussed in section I.A, which involved the partial takings of land for the
expansion of roads, navigation routes, and sand dunes, would almost
certainly fall outside the scope of de minimis takings.
B.

Government Landholdings

A second potential objection to our proposal concentrates on the
shortcomings of the government as a landowner. The gist of this objection is that implementation of our proposal might ultimately increase the
landholdings of the state. Indeed, since the put option would be most
likely exercised when the partial taking leaves an unusable remainder
asset, our proposal might put in the hands of the government relatively

156. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 446 N.E.2d 428, 432 (N.Y.
1983).
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unmarketable lots, since owners of such lots may disproportionately
exercise the put option we would give them. This, in turn, might lead to
three kinds of undesirable effects. First, the government might not be
the optimal owner of the asset but might not be able to dispose of the
lots transferred to it. Second, during the period in which the government
would hold the asset, it would bear the costs of management and
maintenance. Third, aside from the costs of management and maintenance, the government might manage the land poorly or suboptimally.
While acknowledging that the widespread availability of a put option
might have some effect on the amount of property ultimately taken by
the state in eminent domain actions, we believe that any fears lying
behind this potential objection would be overblown. It must be kept in
mind that while the put mechanism in our proposal is novel, there are
already provisions in the laws of many states that recognize that partial
takings may result in poor conﬁgurations of the remaining untaken
assets. Indeed, the Uniform Eminent Domain Code requires states to
offer to acquire the “uneconomic remnant” that remains after the
“acquisition of only part of a property”—that is, after a partial taking.157
While these rules require governments to expose themselves to the risk
of acquiring more than they intended every time they engage in a partial
taking, they do not seem to have resulted in greatly increased government landholdings. The reason for this is twofold. First, states
considering embarking upon partial takings are aware of the rules in
advance and will naturally consider the potential for broader takings
than expected. If the economic burden of the broader takings renders
the project no longer cost effective, the state will have the option not to
embark upon the project at all. Second, even if most takings are partial
takings, the amount of property taken by eminent domain remains a very
small portion of the total amount of property in the country. Even if the
state revolutionizes its compensation practices for partial takings, the
total effect on landholdings in the country will still remain relatively
small.
Additionally, the problems of government acquisitions of unmarketable
portions of land, or “uneconomic remnants,” should not be exaggerated. It
is the partial taking, rather than the put option, that renders the
157. Unif. Eminent Domain Code § 208(a) (Unif. Law Comm’n 1974); see also Alaska
Stat. § 34.60.120(9) (2016); Del. Code Ann. tit. 29, § 9505(9) (2017); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 113-5(9) (LexisNexis 2013); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 154-C (1992); Mont. Code Ann.
§ 70-31-301(9) (2015); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 27, § 13(9) (West 1997); Utah Code Ann. § 5712-13(9) (LexisNexis 2010); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 8.26.180(9) (West 2017).
An interesting variant can be found in Minnesota. There, the “Buy Your Farm” state
law, which is not based on the Uniform Eminent Domain Act, allows owners of partially
taken properties to force a purchase of the remainder within sixty days. Minn. Stat.
§ 216E.12(4) (2016). The provision is limited in several important ways. First, it applies
only to acts of eminent domain by utilities. Id. Second, it allows the utilities to object and
force the dispute into district court. Id. Third, and most importantly, the district court is
instructed not to force the sale if the remainder lacks commercial viability. Id.
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remaining part of the asset unmarketable or uneconomic. The put option
simply forces the state to take full account of the cost of creating such
remnants. To the degree that this improves government decisionmaking
about partial takings, the placement of the burden on the state ought to be
welcomed.
Likewise, the problem of government administration and management of untaken portions of land should not be exaggerated. Governments already own vast amounts of land in the United States. The put
option comes into play only if the state has already decided to engage in a
partial taking. That is, the put option is relevant only when the state has
already decided to increase its property holdings.
A ﬁnal note is in order about the constitutionality of the put option,
given the broader constitutional background of the takings power. As
should be evident from the existing provisions of the Uniform Eminent
Domain Code, there is no reason to fear that the state lacks power to take
the remaining land, whether in response to exercise of the put option or
due to a new decision of the state to seize the remainder by eminent
domain. Even if the state chooses to take the remainder only in order to
retain useful land conﬁgurations, this is the sort of “public use” that
would likely pass constitutional muster under the very forgiving modern
jurisprudence of public use. If the state takes the remainder due to exercise of the put option, the constitutional issue becomes even easier.
Arguably, when the state acquires the land at the behest of the owner
exercising the option, it is not engaging in an act of eminent domain at
all. Rather, it is engaging in a voluntary purchase of land, which does not
need to be justiﬁed as a “public use.”
IV. EXTENSIONS
In this Part, we explore several extensions to our basic proposal.
First, we evaluate an alternative means of implementing our proposal, in
which the option prices would be determined by self-assessment, rather
than by the courts. Second, we explain how our model can be extended
to partial chattel takings. Third, and ﬁnally, we consider and reject the
possibility of using our model to regulate partial regulatory takings.
A.

Self-Assessment

Our model is based on utilizing existing legal doctrines for appraising the value of property affected by partial takings. A more ambitious
version of this model would offer a self-assessment mechanism that would
enable owners of property the government intends to take to state the
value of the taken part as a percentage of the overall value.158 In this
158. For a broader discussion of the beneﬁts of self-assessment, see generally Bell &
Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation Private, supra note 40, at 895–900 (describing selfassessment as an “improvement over existing takings compensation doctrine” because it
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variant, once the government declared its intent to engage in a partial
taking of a certain percentage (size-wise) of a private parcel, the owner
would receive an opportunity to self-assess the value of the targeted
portion (percentage-wise) relative to the whole.
To illustrate how the proposed mechanism would work, assume that
a municipality publicizes its intent to take 40% of Anne’s parcel to
expand a local road. To this end, the government secures an appraisal of
Anne’s entire parcel, which states that the value of the lot as a whole is
$200,000. At this point, Anne would receive an opportunity to report her
own assessment of the ratio of the value between the 40% portion designated to be taken and the property as a whole. For example, Anne might
estimate that the value of the part designated for taking is not 40% of the
whole but actually 65%. Once Anne submits her self-assessment, the
government could choose among two different options: Either it could
take the part it originally planned to take and pay Anne 65% of the value
of entire lot ($130,000), or it could take the whole parcel and pay Anne
full compensation in the amount of $200,000. Anne would also have the
ability to exercise her put option, forcing the government to take the
remainder of the land for an additional $70,000. We assume, for
purposes of this example, that the government’s appraisal of the parcel
as a whole is correct; if Anne were to litigate this appraisal, the court
could determine a different value for the parcel as a whole, while still
accepting Anne’s self-assessment of the relative value of the taken segment. For instance, if the court were to determine that the value of the
lot as a whole was actually $220,000, Anne’s self-assessment of 65% would
still stand, but the government’s choice would now be between paying
Anne $143,000 to take the segment of the lot or paying her $220,000 and
taking the whole lot.
Self-assessment potentially brings two benefits.159 First, self-assessment
lowers the cost of assessing the value of the partially taken land. Neither
party would have to bring expert witnesses to the court, nor would the
court have to engage in any difficult analysis of the competing
assessments. The property owner would simply have to make a declaration. Only if the parties disagreed about the value of the parcel as a
whole would it be necessary to battle in court about appraisals, and, even
then, the battle would be about only the value of the parcel as a whole,
making it unnecessary to introduce any proof about the value of the
taken segment or its interaction with the parcel as a whole.
“ensures the payment of full compensation to condemnees” and “represents a reduction
in transaction costs relative to the existing regime”).
159. Bell & Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, supra note 25, at 300; see also Fennell,
Taking Eminent Domain Apart, supra note 92, at 959 (noting “principles of selfassessment might be employed to overcome the difficulties associated with forced sales in
situations where public use is contested”); Levmore, supra note 108, at 771 (arguing selfassessment provides an alternative to valuations by judges, tax assessors, appraisers, and
juries, which can “generate substantial transacting costs”).
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Second, self-assessment potentially yields a more accurate approximation of the value of the partially taken land.160 This is due to the
strategic pressures the options create. An understatement of the value of
the partial taking makes the partial taking cheaper for the government
and renders it unlikely that the government will choose to seize the
remainder of the land. There is little reason for a property owner to
understate value in this way; the best the owner can achieve with such an
underestimation is to later cut her losses by exercising her put, making
the government take the entire property at the court-set price (which the
owner could always have done under this model, irrespective of the selfassessed price). It is more likely that a property owner would be tempted
to overstate the value of the partially taken property. This would increase
the compensation paid for the partial taking and therefore put more
money in the hands of the owner, for the time being. However, the overestimation would also mean the untaken remainder of the property was
underpriced. This would encourage the government to exercise its call
option (its power of eminent domain) and take the rest of the property.
Again, there would be little to recommend misstating the value in this
way; while the self-assessment would encourage the government to
exercise its call option, the owner could always exercise the put option to
the same effect, without misstating the value.
To be sure, the self-assessed value will be imperfect due to the
anchoring effect of the court’s assessment of the value of the whole
parcel. For instance, it would not make sense for an owner to attempt to
use self-assessment to capture extra subjective value that she attaches to
the parcel. This is because the compensation for the whole parcel will
not include such subjective value.161 Including a large subjective value in
the self-assessment of the partial taking would have the same effect as an
exaggerated self-assessment: It would encourage the government to exercise its call option to take the rest of the property. At that point, the
owner would not only lose compensation for the subjective value; she
would also lose the entire parcel.
There is, however, one ﬂaw with self-assessment in the context of
partial takings. Government decisions to take property are not purely
pecuniary.162 Even if the remainder property looks cheap due to an exag160. See Bell & Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation Private, supra note 40, at 891–95
(discussing self-assessment and strategic pressures for truthful reporting).
161. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
162. Even theories of “ﬁscal illusion,” which presume an important role for ﬁscal
factors in the decision to take property, do not presume that the government will take
property simply because the compensation that will be paid is below market. Rather,
theorists who believe in ﬁscal illusion believe in the much more modest proposition that
government decisions regarding takings are distorted by the fact that certain costs are offbudget. “Fiscal illusion” is, itself, a highly debated phenomenon. See supra note 38 and
accompanying text. Those who reject theories of ﬁscal illusion naturally would reject the
idea that the government takes property solely because the compensation to be paid will
be below market.
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gerated self-assessment of the value of the partial taking on the part of
the owner (Anne in our example), the government might still prefer to
refrain from exercising its call option. If the owner could properly
identify situations in which the government would refrain from taking
the cheap remainder, it would be to her advantage to overstate the value
of the partial taking. Such an overstatement would ensure a greater
payment at the time of the partial taking, and the reluctance of the government to exercise its call option would make the owner secure in the
belief that the overstatement will stand.
B.

Partial Chattel Takings

Takings are not restricted to land. While our proposal presumes that
the partially taken asset is real estate, there is nothing in the law that
restricts partial takings to realty. Indeed, some of the most prominent
takings controversies in recent years have involved chattels, such as
raisins,163 intellectual property,164 and interest income on bank account
funds.165 Yet, while it is easy to ﬁnd partial takings of chattels, adapting
our mechanism to chattel takings requires some adjustment.
The major issue that deserves special attention in the context of
chattels is the deﬁnition of the asset. Our proposal for options that can
reunify a partially taken asset is driven primarily by the advantages of the
uniﬁed asset—easier evaluation, avoidance of suboptimal conﬁgurations,
and the like. However, assets are not deﬁned in heaven.166 One cannot a
priori determine what an asset in property is. Even in the context of partial takings of land, deﬁning the asset can be difficult. Land does not
always come with clearly drawn border lines. Even in cases in which an
individual owns one continuous area of land, the land might best be seen
as multiple parcels. Conversely, the discrete holdings of several individuals might best be seen as collectively composing a single parcel. As we
163. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 133 S. Ct. 2053, 2056 (2013) (holding that California
raisin farmers who were forced to forfeit the portion of their supply in excess of a
production limit set by California’s Secretary of Agriculture could challenge the forfeiture
under the Fifth Amendment).
164. See Dustin Marlan, Comment, Trademark Takings: Trademarks as Constitutional
Property Under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, 15 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1581, 1583–85
(2013) (contending that “‘propertization’ of the trademark regime, together with
constitutional property dimensions favorable to trademark law, supports the claim that
trademarks ought to be subject to the Takings Clause”). But see Zoltek Corp. v. United
States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding that patent infringement cannot
form the basis for a Fifth Amendment taking under the Tucker Act).
165. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 231–34, 237 (2003) (holding that
the state of Washington was permitted to use interest on lawyers’ trust accounts for clients
to pay for legal services for indigent litigants under the Fifth Amendment’s public use
doctrine and that no compensation was owed).
166. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconﬁguring Property in Three
Dimensions, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1015, 1024 (2008) (discussing the role of asset
conﬁguration in optimizing value).
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discussed in the context of offsets, the law often focuses on the owner
rather than the number of parcels in deciding whether to consider a
taking to be partial.167 Speciﬁcally, the law may consider a taking “partial”
when only part of an owner’s realty is taken, even though the taking is of
one or more discrete parcels.168
These difficulties are greatly compounded when chattels are taken.
To be sure, there are easy cases. When discussing an automobile, for
instance, the car as a whole is clearly a discrete asset, and if the government sought to seize the hood, or a door, we would easily identify the
proposed taking as a partial taking. But if the “taking” is of some or all of
the interest paid to a bank account—the kind of taking addressed by the
Supreme Court in Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation169—it is harder
to ﬁnd an asset whose completeness is of interest to us. Of course, it is
possible to talk about a bank account as an “undivided” asset.170 The
seizure of half the money in a bank account could thus be described as a
“partial taking.” But it is unclear why we should care that this taking is
partial. The cash in a bank account—whether the full bank account or
only half—is just as easily measured in value and just as easily used in the
marketplace. The difficulties we described as characteristic of partial
takings of land171 would seem inapposite.
We therefore suggest that if our proposal were to be used in the
context of chattel takings, it should be modiﬁed to take account of the
difficulty in identifying assets whose wholeness should be protected. We
suggest that the option created for a partial taking—the owner’s put—
should be created only after a preliminary examination by the court of
the asset in question. Speciﬁcally, in order to trigger our partial takings
mechanism, the owner would have to prove to the satisfaction of the
court that the taken property was only a part of a larger asset, that the
larger asset was one whose “wholeness” was valuable enough to warrant
legal protection, and that the value of the “whole” asset could readily be
measured by the court. Only if the court made this ﬁnding would the
court proceed to the rest of the steps in our proposal: measuring the
value of the asset as a whole and of the portion taken, and setting the
strike price for the put option.
We anticipate that, in some cases, the showing of the value of asset
wholeness would be easy, as in the takings of part of a boat or a car. In
other cases, such as cash, such a showing would be near impossible.
Finally, there would be cases that lend themselves to a showing of the

167. See supra section I.B.1.
168. See supra section I.B.1.
169. 524 U.S. 156, 160 (1998).
170. E.g., In re Will of Filfiley, 313 N.Y.S.2d 793, 795–96, 803 (Sup. Ct. 1970) (noting that
a testator’s “undivided half is not readily alienable and he can under no circumstances
convey the whole without his joint tenant joining in the deed”).
171. See supra section I.C.
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importance of “wholeness” but are not always clear cut, such as the
seizure of shares of a corporation or a share of a piece of intellectual
property.
C.

Partial Regulatory Takings

Our model has concerned itself so far with physical seizures of property, whether land or chattels. In this section, we assess the applicability
of our model to regulatory takings.
Regulatory takings doctrine is perhaps the most complex doctrine
within the world of takings and, indeed, one of the most controversial
and difficult in the world of law.172 Generally speaking, regulatory takings
doctrine is designed to identify situations in which a government actor
negatively inﬂuences the value of property while purporting to exercise a
power other than the power of eminent domain.173
According to the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the government must pay “just compensation” to any owner whose property is
“taken for public use” but not to owners whose property values are
affected by non-“takings.”174 This is true for many state constitutions as
well.175 Naturally, seizures of property by eminent domain are “takings.”176
But government regulation of property may be deemed a “taking” as well,
if it goes “too far.”177 The problem and the controversy lie in determining
when government action goes “too far.”
Courts developed a variety of doctrines to help draw the line
between actions that have gone too far—regulatory takings that are
unconstitutional unless accompanied by the payment of just compensa172. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory
Takings Doctrine, 22 Ecology L.Q. 89, 90 (1995) (arguing for the negation of regulatory
takings); Holly Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 19 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 1, 1 (2003)
(describing regulatory takings doctrine as “famously incoherent”); Daniel A. Farber,
Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 Const. Comment. 279, 279 (1992) (“[T]akings
doctrine is a mess.”); Mark Fenster, The Stubborn Incoherence of Regulatory Takings, 28
Stan. Envtl. L.J. 525, 529–30 (2009) (noting the “messiness” of regulatory takings doctrine
and suggesting that it is inevitable); Eduardo Moisés Peñalver, Regulatory Taxings, 104
Colum. L. Rev. 2182, 2186 (2004) (“Takings Clause jurisprudence is characterized by
nothing if not the confusion and intense disagreement it generates.”); Carol M. Rose,
Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 561, 561–
62 (1984) (calling takings “[b]y far the most intractable constitutional property issue”).
173. For a comprehensive discussion, see generally Fischel, supra note 42; Bill
Higgins, Inst. for Local Gov’t, Regulatory Takings and Land Use Regulation: A Primer for
Public Agency Staff 6 (2006), http://mrsc.org/getmedia/FB8A8201-E2CC-453B-BE00AECEFA196562/m58takings.aspx [http://perma.cc/3Z6X-SHL7].
174. U.S. Const. amend. V.
175. See generally Nakagiri, supra note 145, at 15, 18–19 (contending that “state
takings provisions arguably provide greater protection of private property than does the
federal Takings Clause”).
176. E.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
177. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
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tion to owners—and those that have not—exercises of the regulatory
power whose burdens must be suffered by owners.178
Two rules are particularly important for our analysis of partial
takings. One of these rules is the “total wipeout” rule established by
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.179 According to the ruling in Lucas,
a government action that completely wipes out all commercial value of
property is a per se taking, for which compensation must be paid.180 By
contrast, the approach generally followed in cases in which there is no
wipeout is the balancing test established by Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. New York City.181 Under the Penn Central approach, there are no hardand-fast rules on identifying a regulatory taking. Instead, courts must
make case-by-case determinations by evaluating the facts in light of three
case-speciﬁc factors: the owner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations, the nature of the government action, and the degree of diminution
in property value.182
Questions associated with partial takings are particularly relevant to
the issue of partial regulatory takings. Two clusters of potential partial
regulatory takings cases can be identiﬁed.
One cluster involves regulations that do not wipe out all commercial
value of a property in perpetuity but do wipe out all value for a period of
time or all value of some of the property. Consider, for instance, the case
of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island.183 In Palazzolo, the Court had to consider
whether the owner of seventy-four lots of land (the result of subdividing
three parcels that had been bought together) could claim the beneﬁt of
the total wipeout rule when some of the downland lots had lost all their
commercial value, while some of the upland lots retained signiﬁcant
value.184 As in all cases of partial regulatory takings, the Court declined to
ﬁnd a total wipeout. Instead, the Court ruled that all the lots should be
considered together for purposes of the taking (just as courts rule that
all lots should be considered together for purposes of evaluating the
applicability of the offset doctrine in cases of partial takings185) and that
since some value was retained, there was no total wipeout.186 Similarly, in
178. See e.g., Raymond R. Coletta, The Measuring Stick of Regulatory Takings: A
Biological and Cultural Analysis, 1 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 20, 20–22 (1998) (discussing the
rules used to determine when regulation requires payment of compensation under the
Takings Clause).
179. 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
180. Id. There are some exceptions to this rule, such as total wipeouts that are
attributable to abating a nuisance that would traditionally have been recognized as such.
See Coletta, supra note 178, at 79 n.283.
181. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
182. Id.
183. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
184. Id. at 613–16.
185. See supra section I.B.1.
186. Palazollo, 533 U.S. at 630–31.
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the case of Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, the Court considered a regulation that wiped out all commercial
value of certain lands during a moratorium period in which no construction was allowed.187 The moratorium was lifted after several years, and on
that basis, the Court determined that there had been no total wipeout.188
A second, and broader, cluster of cases involves what is known as the
“parcel as a whole” rule, or the “denominator problem.”189 This cluster
of cases involves court interpretations of the prong of the Penn Central
balancing test that requires courts to consider the degree to which the
regulation has diminished property value.190 In order to assess diminution in property value, courts must ﬁrst determine the baseline from
which such diminution is to be measured. The facts of Penn Central are
illustrative. In Penn Central, the Court considered whether an early
historic-preservation law (New York’s Landmarks Preservation Law) had
worked a regulatory taking by forbidding development of Grand Central
Station in New York.191 The Court engaged in an explicitly “ad hoc”
factual inquiry that examined many aspects of the particular property.192
One argument that the property owner raised in its own favor was that
the regulation essentially deprived the Penn Central Transportation
Company of all ability to proﬁt from air rights above Grand Central
Station.193 The Court was unsympathetic. The Court insisted that what
ought to be examined is the “parcel as a whole—here, the city tax block
designated as the ‘landmark site.’”194 In other words, the Court said when
courts evaluate whether a regulation unduly diminishes property value,
courts should aggregate, rather than disaggregate, the owner’s holdings.
Courts should not be bound by the manner in which the land is divided
for future potential deeds; rather, courts should aggregate related pieces
of land into a single “whole parcel.” Obviously, the more land aggregated
into the “whole parcel,” the less any single regulation will be thought to
have proportionately diminished its value.195

187. 535 U.S. 302, 311–12 (2002).
188. Id. at 330–31.
189. See Michelman, supra note 42, at 1192; Danaya C. Wright, A New Time for
Denominators: Toward a Dynamic Theory of Property in the Regulatory Takings Relevant
Parcel Analysis, 34 Envtl. L. 175, 190–91, 218 (2004).
190. Wright, supra note 189, at 188.
191. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 115–17 (1978).
192. Id. at 124.
193. Id. at 130.
194. Id. at 131.
195. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631–32 (2001) (“The case comes to
us on the premise that petitioner’s entire parcel serves as the basis for his takings claim,
and, so framed, the total deprivation argument fails.”); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1016–17 & n.7 (1992) (discussing whether an owner who cannot develop 90%
of his tract “has been deprived of all economically beneﬁcial use of the burdened portion
of the tract, or . . . has suffered a mere diminution in value of the tract as a whole”).
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The “parcel-as-a-whole” rule, and more generally partial regulatory
takings, has been subject to ﬁerce scholarly debate.196 Some have suggested that the Court artificially reduced the likelihood that a regulation
will be viewed as a regulatory taking and decried the judicial deference.197
Others have celebrated the Court for seeing through an obvious
manipulation, denying owners the ability to engage in pretend divisions
of the property (conceptual severance, in Margaret Radin’s felicitous
phrase198) and thereby blocking artiﬁcial inﬂation of regulatory takings
claims. Be that as it may, the judicial approach to date has been clear.
According to the courts, there are no “partial regulatory takings.” A
regulatory taking, if it occurs, relates to the entirety of the affected asset.
We have to consider the whole of the asset. Even if there is a partial
wipeout of value, or a total wipeout for a limited time (whose limits are
not initially known), it’s a matter for the balancing test.
Land is considered to have been either subject to a “regulatory
taking” or not subject to such a taking.199 One cannot divide things up
and say that part has been subject to a regulatory taking and another part
has not. The contrast to physical takings could not be sharper. Courts
consider the physical seizure of even a very small part of a large parcel a
per se taking, for which just compensation must be paid.200 But the

196. See David Dana, Why Do We Have the Parcel-as-a-Whole Rule, 39 Vt. L. Rev. 617,
621–24 (2015) (arguing the parcel-as-a-whole rule is superior to its alternatives); Steven J.
Eagle, The Parcel and Then Some: Unity and Ownership and the Parcel as a Whole, 36 Vt.
L. Rev. 549, 565–67 (2012) (arguing for a narrow application of the parcel-as-a-whole rule
that does not aggregate separately titled lots); Daniel L. Siegel, How the History and
Purpose of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine Help to Deﬁne the Parcel as a Whole, 36 Vt.
L. Rev. 603, 618 (2012) (arguing for a broad application of the parcel-as-a-whole rule that
generally supports aggregation of contiguous lots, even if separately titled); John E. Fee,
Comment, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Takings Claims, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1535, 1557–58 (1994) (arguing for a very limited application of the parcel-as-a-whole rule
that would treat as separate any horizontal segment of land that has independent
economic viability); Keith Woffinden, Comment, The Parcel as a Whole: A Presumptive
Structural Approach for Determining When the Government Has Gone Too Far, 2008
BYU L. Rev. 623, 638–40 (proposing an alternative to the holding in Penn Central whereby
courts would include contiguous property held by the same owner when determining the
relevant parcel).
197. See Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina, supra note 43, at 1376–77.
198. Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the
Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1667, 1674 (1988).
199. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
327 (2002) (“[The Court] does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and
attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely
abrogated. . . . [T]his Court focuses rather both on the character of the action . . . and
extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole . . . .” (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130–31)).
200. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426–35 (1982)
(holding that, regardless of size, a permanent physical occupation by the government—or
a third party authorized by the government—constitutes a taking for which just
compensation is due under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
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regulatory taking of a huge portion of value of a parcel is not necessarily
a taking,201 and the effects must be considered for the “parcel as a
whole.”
One might imagine an extension to our proposal in which we would
tackle partial regulatory takings just as we suggest treating partial physical
takings. A call option in the hands of the government and a put option in
the hands of the owner would accompany any regulation that diminished
property value. This would bring a completely new approach to “whole
parcel” questions. Essentially, a parcel would be whole if the owner
wanted it to be such (as proved by exercise of the put) but not otherwise.
Unfortunately, however, we cannot see how our proposal can easily
be transferred to the world of partial regulatory takings. The greatest
problem is establishing the strike price. Unlike in cases of partial physical
takings, “partial regulatory takings” do not require courts to assess precisely the value of the land rights taken. Except in the unlikely case in
which the regulatory action is challenged as a regulatory taking, the
courts may entirely ignore the value of the “taking.” Even in the context
of a regulatory takings challenge, the Penn Central test does not require a
precise measure of the value of the “taking” in order to determine
whether a regulatory taking has taken place; it is sufficient for courts to
use generalized statements.202 Creating a mechanism for setting the strike
price for the put and call options could thus be prohibitively expensive.
Moreover, we acknowledge that bringing our proposal to the world
of regulatory takings would profoundly alter the world of regulation.
Property regulation is ubiquitous.203 Potentially, every zoning change, or
even property tax, is a regulatory taking.204 Giving the owner a put option
to force a sale of her entire interest to the government whenever the
government regulates property would turn every regulation into a taking
(at the option of the owner). This would vastly expand the category of
compensable regulatory takings. The administrative and judicial costs
arising from the implementation of such a scheme would likely be enormous. We, therefore, caution against applying our model to regulatory
takings. The boundary between physical and regulatory takings also
demarcates the limits of our model.
CONCLUSION
The ubiquity of partial takings, together with the unique challenges
they present, creates a clear case for creative solutions to longstanding
problems posed by this important land use tool. A close inspection of
current partial takings law reveals a handful of specialized doctrines that
201.
202.
203.
204.

E.g., Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130–31 (eliminating essentially all air rights).
See id. at 123–24.
E.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 324.
See Epstein, Takings: Private Property, supra note 42, at 95.
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courts adopted on an ad hoc basis to address speciﬁc problems without
much attention to systemic effects and, in particular, to the misalignment
these doctrines create between partial takings and total takings. Despite
their immense practical signiﬁcance, the takings world has largely
ignored partial takings. This is unfortunate. The current approach fails
to do justice to partial takings and comes at a signiﬁcant cost to society.
In this Article, we carefully reviewed the deﬁning characteristics of
partial takings and then built upon our ﬁndings to devise a novel
approach to partial takings that balances social and private interests. The
key element of our approach is the creation of a new option that would
empower the owner of the partially condemned lot, if she so chooses, to
force the government to purchase the remainder of the asset. Per our
proposal, the exercise of this option would be voluntary, which means
that owners would exercise it only if doing so would be desirable. Our
mechanism would guarantee that the layout of the affected parcels would
not be distorted by partial takings that threaten to leave a remainder that
is unusable or unmarketable. Our mechanism, when exercised by the
owner, would also have the salutary effect of transferring the title to the
taken parcel as a whole to a new single owner—namely, the government—giving it the full panoply of rights and powers that come with a
fee simple interest. Finally, our proposal would reduce the transaction
and litigation costs that currently attend instances of partial takings.
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